Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property by Harding, Sarah
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 72 | Issue 3 Article 4
Summer 1997
Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural
Property
Sarah Harding
Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Archaeological Anthropology Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harding, Sarah (1997) "Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 72 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol72/iss3/4




For the past six years, museums across the country have been scrambling to
determine the origins and appropriate resting places for their Native American
collections.' Museums and agencies that previously had no reason to doubt the
security of their entitlements now face the prospect of the loss of significant
objects. The legislation that has brought about this change in policy and the
subsequent potential alteration in property rights is the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 ("NAGPRA" or "the Act").2
NAGPRA instructs federal agencies and museums receiving federal funds to
identify the origin and cultural affiliation of Native American cultural items and
then to expeditiously return some of them to culturally-affiliated Indian tribes.
But not all items are treated the same. NAGPRA distinguishes various types of
"cultural items" and assigns different repatriation procedures to each category.
Although the agencies and museums affected are provided with a defense against
some repatriation requests, the Act represents a significant policy shift, enabling
Native Americans to reclaim cultural items that have long been in the custody of
others. Of particular interest is a class of cultural items referred to as "cultural
patrimony." "Cultural patrimony" is defined as objects that were owned by the
* Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am deeply indebted to Carol Rose
for reading many drafts of this paper and for her comments and criticisms. Special thanks are
also due to Steve Heyman and Richard Wright who provided useful comments on some of the
issues raised in this paper. The mistakes are all mine.
1. See, e.g., Mary V. Chandler, Building a Sacred Trust: Strengthened by New Federal
Laws Governing Museum Artifacts, Native Americans Reclaim Their Heritage, ROCKY
MOUNTAINNEWS, May 29, 1994, at 56A, available in 1994 WL 6701562; Eric Gibson, Giving
It Back to the Indians: In Quiet Revolt, Museum Pieces May Be Repatriated, WASH. TIMES,
May 15, 1991, at El, available in 1991 WL 5562308; Marsha King, Returning a Heritage-A
Federal Law Has Changed the Way Museums View Their Mission as Caretakers of Culture,
SEAT'LE TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at Ki; Museum Set to Lose Indian Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1993, at A12 (The Oglala Sioux in South Dakota have claimed the entire collection of a
small museum in Barre, Massachusetts. The objects have been traced to the massacre at
Wounded Knee.); A Sacred Trust: Museums Returning Disputed Art Objects, DENVER POST,
May 30, 1995, at D-08, available in 1995 WL 6574402; Skeletons in Museum Closets,
ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Jan. 2, 1992, at A12, available in 1992 WL 4562567; Charles Storch,
At Peace with the Past: Museums Create a Flurry ofMixed Emotions as They Race to Divulge
Native American Artifacts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1993, at Tempo 1, available in 1993 WL
11124090.
2. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-
3013 (1994).
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culturally-affiliated tribe and as such were inalienable by any individual,
including members of the culturally-affiliated tribe?
The justification for repatriation seems, at first blush, relatively
straightforward. The NAGPRA provision, § 3001(3)(D), describes cultural
patrimony as objects with ongoing cultural significance that are owned by the
tribe and were owned by the tribe at the time of alienation. In the absence of
evidence that the tribe itself sold or gifted the property in question, it seems that
the Act is merely prompting the return of property illegally removed from the
tribe-in essence specific restitution ignoring limitation periods. But justifying
repatriation is not quite so simple. Determining the illegality of transfers by
individual tribal members is certain to be fraught with difficulties given the
passage of time. The American Museum of Natural History, for example, has in
its possession a calico-wrapped sacred bundle that belonged to Plains Cree Chief
Big Bear until his death. The sacred bundle was given to the institution fifty
years ago by an unnamed native with the instructions, "keep it well." Now there
are numerous tribes and individuals claiming ownership of the bundle. The
Montana, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba Crees are all independently claiming
ownership as is the adopted great-great-grandson of Plains Cree Chief Big Bear.5
Determining who owned the bundle after Big Bear's death, and thus whether the
transfer was legitimate, will not be an easy task. In such situations, it is safe to
assume that if the object is important to the affiliated Indian tribe, the
uncertainties of ownership and the circumstances of alienation will be
overlooked. In other words, a recognition of the importance of an object will
likely be both prior to and determinative of a finding of tribal ownership;6 the
importance of an object may in fact by itself be sufficient to categorize property
3. Id. § 3001(3)(D). Throughout the paper, "cultural patrimony" and "cultural property"
will be used interchangeably. Since the phrase "cultural items," as used in § 3001(3) of
NAGPRA, refers to a much larger group of objects, including human remains, it will only be
used in connection with NAGPRA and its definition therein.
4. Rebecca Clements, Misconceptions of Culture: Native Peoples and Cultural Property
Under Canadian Law, 49 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 8 (1991).
5. Id. at 1, 8.
6. Although the importance of an object may lead to a determination of tribal ownership,
it cannot be said that a clear indication of tribal ownership carries with it an assumption of
importance; not all tribally owned objects have the requisite amount of ongoing tribal
significance. See, e.g., Ernest Beaglehole, Ownership and Inheritance in an American Indian
Tribe, 20 IowA L. REv. 304, 305-11 (1934) (discussing individual and group ownership of
property amongst the Hopi).
There seems to be some dispute regarding ownership patterns in traditional Native American
society. Some commentators argue that almost all property was owned by the tribe thus
prohibiting any individual transfers. See S. REP. No. 101-473, at 7 (1990) (expressing concern
about the definition of cultural patrimony given that "no object could be conveyed by an
individual because it was owned by the collective whole"); FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 605-06 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., Michie Co. 1982) (1942)
[hereinafter COHEN]. Others have concluded that many Indian tribes had a "well developed
legal system that emphasized individual rights and individual ownership." Beaglehole, supra,
at 305-08 (discussing goods which were considered personal rather than communal property
amongst the Hopi); Bruce L. Benson, Customwy Indian Law: Two Case Studies, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 27 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992).
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as cultural patrimony. Thus, given the possibility that importance rather than
ownership will dictate repatriation, there must be a more compelling justification
for repatriation than specific restitution. To put it another way, there must be
some justification for asserting Native American ownership when there is no
clear evidence in support of tribal ownership. The purpose of this Article is to
identify and discuss arguments that might provide such a justification. Although
NAGPRA has spawned the most recent repatriations and in fact has created the
most significant and widespread return of Native American objects to date, my
search for a justification will go well beyond interpreting the Act.
I will address three basic arguments in support of repatriation. The first
disregards the issue of ownership per se and views repatriation simply as a means
of compensating Native Americans for the destruction of their culture. Under this
approach, Native Americans are not necessarily recognized as the rightful owners
of cultural patrimony prior to repatriation, but rather the property is given to
them as a form of symbolic compensation in recognition of their suffering and
the near destruction of their culture. Although this is a compelling justification,
we will discover that it alone does not offer a sufficient foundation for
repatriation.
The second approach is a series of arguments focused on the relationship
between the importance or value of an object and ownership. Why might the
importance of an object to a specific tribe lead to a recognition of the tribe's
ownership of the object in question and in doing so defeat other legitimate
ownership claims? I will look at three ideas that might justify a strong connection
between importance and ownership. The first is a relatively barebones efficiency
argument based on the recognition of ethnic externalities. The second examines
the purported connection between objects and cultural identity relying on an
extension of Margaret Radin's personhood theory of property. The third and final
idea employs the doctrine of customary right-an ancient doctrine that, as Carol
Rose argues, recognizes that some property actually increases in value when a
group of people has access to it. I conclude that of the three ideas, customary
right provides the best and most complete explanation for recognizing Native
American ownership of their cultural objects.
The third approach argues that cultural property can never really be owned.
The significance of the objects themselves rather than ownership rights may
dictate both appropriate treatment and possession, thus unsettling the normal
incidents of ownership. Although this approach provides another justification for
repatriation, it is important to recognize that in certain circumstances, it may lead
to non-Native American possession and control.7
7. I should mention one last approach here that I do not intend to explore further in this
Article. The ownership of cultural property may actually be a cultural right, not unlike a right
to speak a certain language or practice a religion. As a cultural right, non-Native Americans
would be held under a duty to return cultural property to its original Native American owners,
regardless of any intervening interest. The foundation for such a right might be a broader right
to membership in a cultural group and cultural survival, requisite elements of individual
flourishing. In short, Native American cultural patrimony may be an important external
manifestation of Native American culture and as such is essential for cultural survival and the
flourishing of a Native American identity.
1997]
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Prior to my assessment of these various justifications, I will take a closer look
at the NAGPRA provisions concerning cultural patrimony and the relevant
features of personal property law. This analysis will be relatively brief as there
already exist numerous articles addressing the legislative and common law
protection of Native American and other cultural property.8
Many will find the discussion so far lacking in sensitivity and respect for
Native Americans. The importance of a cultural object and the legality of a
transfer are, under the Act, to be determined by the culturally-affiliated tribe in
accordance with tribal law.9 NAGPRA in effect substitutes tribal property
institutions for Anglo-American property institutions. Surely the most important
aspect of the provisions relating to cultural patrimony is precisely that they rely
Cultural property may, in this sense, be considered what Denise Reaume has labeled a
"participatory good." Denise Reaume, Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods, 38 U.
TORONTO L.J. 1, 10 (1988). "Participatory goods" are those that "involve activities that not
only require many in order to produce the good but are valuable only because of the joint
involvement of many. Production itself is part of what is valued-the good is the
participation." Id. Although most rights are individualized both because of the nature of a right
and the types of goods being secured by such rights, Reaume suggests that there may be a
group right to participatory goods:
In such cases, the right cannot be an individual one because it is a claim to a
participatory good, and it is a group right because it is a claim to a public good
which applies only to a segment of society and must be claimed as against the
rest.
Id. at 24.
8. See, e.g., Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for
Assessing Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 437, 441-51 (1986) (detailing the development of the law relating to Indians and
museum treasures); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 586-641 (1995) (discussing the
current treatment under both common and statutory law of all cultural property in the United
States); Steven Platzman, Objects of Controversy: The Native American Right to Repatriation,
41 AM. U. L. REv. 517, 525-49 (arguing that the common law doctrines concerning personal
property are not adequately suited to the Native American situation and detailing the various
statutory schemes for protecting Native American objects); Symposium, The Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 and State Repatriation Related Legislation,
24 ARIZONA ST. L.J. 1 (1992).
There is also a steadily increasing body of literature on the international movement of
cultural property. See, e.g., John E. Bersin, The Protection of Cultural Property and the
Promotion of International Trade in Art, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125 (1992); Gael
M. Graham, Protection and Reversion of Cultural Property: Issues of Definition and
Justification, 21 INT'L LAW. 755 (1987) (analyzing the various international treaties and
conventions dealing with cultural property); Lawrence M. Kaye, The Future of the Past:
Recovering Cultural Property, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 23 (1996); Mark F. Lindsay,
The Recovery of Cultural Artifacts: The Legacy of Our Archaeological Heritage, 22 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 164 (1990); Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the "Cultural" and
"Property" Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J.
1033 (1992-93); M. Catherine Vernon, Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of
Protective Intervention, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L 435 (1994).
9. Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understanding, Preserving,
and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians: Human Rights,
Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 179-81 (1992).
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on Native American attitudes toward cultural objects and that these attitudes
should be a sufficient justification for repatriation. I do not however want to give
up on the Anglo-American legal tradition so quickly. The common law legal
tradition may very well offer us additional reasons to encourage repatriation of
cultural patrimony, reasons that are reflected in entrenched legal institutions.
Furthermore, the repatriation of cultural property is an issue that extends far
beyond the concern of Native Americans. Thus, seeking a justification for
repatriation promises to increase our understanding of the importance of cultural
property in a wide variety of cases involving artifacts and cultures from all
corners of the globe.
II. NAGPRA AND THE COMMON LAW
A. The Legislation
Until recently, there have been no guidelines concerning Native American
ownership of cultural items. Some tribes have been successful in negotiating the
return of specific collections, but the absence of guidelines and legislative
directives has prevented large scale repatriation. ° For much of the history of the
United States, the acquisition and disinterment of cultural objects and grave
remains by non-Indians have been officially encouraged." The most notorious
example is the Surgeon General's 1868 army personnel directive requesting the
collection of Indian skulls and other body parts, primarily for scientific inquiry.
The order resulted in the theft of thousands of Indian skulls, many of which were
obtained by decapitating dead Indians lying on battlefields and burial scaffolds. 2
10. Two of the largest repatriations are Stanford University's return of 550 Ohlone Indians
for reburial in 1989, see Anne C. Roark, Stanford Agrees to Return Indian Skeletal Remains,
L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at 1, and the University of Minnesota's return of 1000 American
Indian skulls and bones, see Patrick Sweeney, Indians Win Battle to Bury Ancestors, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, July 16, 1989, at lB.
As of 1992, the Smithsonian, which is governed by separate legislation, the National
Museum of the American Indian Act of 1989, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q-15 (1994), had
completed six requests for repatriation and had over 50 requests on file. Of the six completed
cases, five concerned human remains and one involved sacred objects of the Zuni Tribe.
Thomas W. Killion et al., Repatriation at the Smithsonian 3 (Repatriation Office, Smithsonian
Institution 1992).
11. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 42-45 (1992);
see also Native American Grave and Burial Protection Act (Repatriation), Native American
Repatriation of Cultural Patrimony Act, and Heard Museum Report: Hearing on S. 1021 and
S. 1980 Before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., 193 (1990)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Walter R. Echo-Hawk, staff attorney for the Native
American Right Fund, quoting historian Cole: "'In retrospect it is clear that the goods flowed
irrevocably from native hands to Euro-American ones until little was left in possession of the
people who had invented, made, and used them."').
12. The Surgeon General's Order of 1868 as reproduced in ROBERT E. BIEDER, A BRIEF
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN REMAINS 36-37 (1990),
available in Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 278-362.
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The common law also generally favored the interests of non-Indians and granted
ownership rights to those in possession of important cultural objects and Indian
remains, often failing to recognize the significance of the objects to Native
Americans. 3 The federal government has, however, slowly changed its attitude
toward Native American cultural objects. In 1979, it passed legislation regulating
prospective discoveries of Indian remains and artifacts on tribal lands. With
respect to objects discovered on non-tribal federal lands, the legislation requires
that the associated Native American tribe be notified and it permits the associated
tribe to object to excavation. 4 Then, in 1989, Congress passed the National
Museum for the American Indian Act, which, among other things, directs the
Smithsonian to inventory human remains and funerary objects and to comply
with any legitimate requests made for the repatriation of an artifact. 5
The most significant policy change, however, occurred in November of 1990
with the enactment of NAGPRA.' 6 NAGPRA extends the rights of Native
Americans with respect to post-enactment excavations of cultural items 7 on
federal and tribal lands.'" More significantly, it provides for the repatriation of
cultural items in the possession of federal agencies and museums (excluding the
Smithsonian). 9 The statute divides "cultural items" into five categories: "human
remains," "associated" and "unassociated funerary objects," "sacred objects,"
and "cultural patrimony." NAGPRA instructs museums to inventory and describe
their Native American cultural items determining where possible the "cultural
affiliation" with a particular Indian tribe."0 "Cultural affiliation" is loosely
defined as "a relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonably
13. With respect to cultural objects, see, for example, Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 61
N.Y.S. 1027 (Sup. Ct. 1899), affd, 62 N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1901) (rejecting Onondaga Nation's
claim of ownership to four wampum belts). The return of the wampum belts was eventually
negotiated, 75 years later. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 11, at 43 n.30.
With respect to human remains and burial grounds see Wana the Bear v. Community Const.,
Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1982). See also Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 11, at 45-
47. But see Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
14. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (1994); see
also Echo-Hawk, supra note 8, at 448-51.
The discovery of remains or artifacts on private or state lands is covered by state legislation,
where it exists, and the common law. H. MARCUS PRICE III, DISPUTING THE DEAD: U.S. LAW
ON ABORIGINAL REMAINS AND GRAVE GOODS 122-25 (appendix) (1991); Echo-Hawk, supra
note 8, at 52-54; Catherine Bergin Yalung & Laurel I. Wala, A Survey of State Repatriation
and Burial Protection Statutes, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 419 (1992).
15. 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q-15 (1994). The Smithsonian has subsequently established a
repatriation office to deal with inventories and requests.
16. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994).
17. "Cultural items" are defined as "associated funerary objects," "unassociated funerary
objects," "sacred objects," and "cultural patrimony." Id. § 3001(3).
18. Id. § 3002.
19. "Museum" is defined as "any institution or State or local government agency.., that
receives Federal funds and has possession of, or control over, Native American cultural items."
Id. § 3001(8).
20. Id. § 3003 (addressing inventory of human remains and associated funerary objects) and




traced historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group."'" Upon request of the
culturally-affiliated Indian tribe or, in the case of human remains and associated
funerary objects, the "known lineal descendants" of the Native American or of
the tribe, the items must be repatriated22 unless the federal agency or museum is
able to establish that it has a "right of possession."' The "right of possession"
defense does not apply to repatriation requests for human remains and associated
funerary objects. Furthermore, an examination of a few definitions reveals that
"cultural patrimony" is subject to only a limited "right of possession" defense.
A "right of possession" is defined as "possession obtained with the voluntary
consent of an individual or group that had authority of alienation."'24 And
"cultural patrimony" is defined as:
an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central
to the Native American group or culture itself, rather than property owned by
an individual Native American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated,
appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of whether or not the
individual is a member of the Indian tribe.., and such object shall have been
considered inalienable by such Native American group at the time the object
was separated from such group.2
Together these two definitions permit federal agencies or museums to retain
objects of cultural patrimony only if they can trace their title back to a voluntary
transfer by the culturally-affiliated Indian tribe.26 "Cultural patrimony" is
classified as inalienable except by the culturally-affiliated tribe and in fact was
often referred to as "objects of inalienable communal property" in the legislative
history. 7 Thus unlike "sacred objects" or other cultural items, the status of
cultural patrimony is determined not by common law personal property rules or
some variation of these rules but instead by tribal attitudes toward property and
the significance of the object.28 It is difficult to identify precisely what types of
cultural objects fall within this category of "cultural patrimony," but the
21. Id. § 3001(2). The definition of "tribe" includes Indian aggregations which are not
federally recognized as Indian tribes. Id. § 3001(7); see also Abenaki Nation of Mississquoi
v. Hughes, 805 F. Supp. 234 (D. Vt. 1992) (Abenaki Nation is not a federally-recognized
Indian Tribe under the National Historic Preservation Act, but nonetheless falls within the
NAGPRA definition of "tribe.").
22. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a).
23. Id. § 3005(c).
24. Id. § 3001(13) (emphasis added).
25. Id § 3001(3)(D) (emphasis added); see also Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act Regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 10 (1996).
26. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 11, at 66.
27. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367,
4371; id. at 25-29 (letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, of the
Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs).
28. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 11, at 66.
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legislative history defines them as objects of "great importance" such as Zuni
War Gods or the wampum belts of the Iroquois.29
B. Entitlement and the Common Law
Since the time of the first European settlements in North America, non-Indians
have been digging up, raiding, and stealing Native American cultural objects and
human remains.30 For at least over a century, American Indian tribes have
attempted to repossess the remains of their ancestors and their cultural heritage.
One of the best recorded and earliest attempts to repossess cultural patrimony
was the Onondaga nation's appeal for the return of numerous wampum belts.
Wampum belts were made out of colorful wampum beads and were used for
religious and commemorative events?' In 1899, the Onondaga lost a court battle
over the wampum belts, one of which was described as "representing the first
treaty stipulation between the Six Nations and General George Washington,
picturing in wampum beadwork the council house, General Washington, the 0-
do-ta-ho, or president of the tribes, and thirteen representatives of the
colonies."32 It took the Six Nations Confederacy another seventy-five years
before they were able to negotiate the return of the wampum.3
For equally long, museums have argued that they have a legal right to possess
these objects and an ethical obligation to retain them for scientific inquiry and
historical preservation. These ethical considerations are argued as forcefully
today by some museum curators as they were a century ago?" When Stanford
University agreed to return the remains of 550 Ohlone Indians, one Stanford
Professor claimed that the reburial of the bones would be "scientifically
29. S. REP. No. 101-473, at 7-8 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 56-61 for a
discussion of a New York case concerning wampum belts; see also 43 C.F.R. § 10. For a
discussion of the Zuni war gods, see Echo-Hawk, supra note 8, at 444.
30. Deborah L. Nichols et al., Ancestral Sites, Shrines, and Graves: Native American
Perspectives on the Ethics of Collecting Cultural Properties, in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING
CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY? 27, 27-29 (Phyllis Mauch
Messenger ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING].
Native American objects and remains are still regularly subject to theft, destruction, and
desecration. See Antonia M. De Meo, More Effective Protection for Native American Cultural
Property Through Regulation of Export, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1994) (noting how
the increased value of Native American artifacts has led to a rise in the frequency of looting and
destruction); The Struggle to Protect Indian Graves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at A16.
31. Bowen Blair, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus America Museums-A Battle for
Artifacts, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 125, 127 (1979) (The wampum are said to be not only religious
and historical documents, but also representations of current existence.).
32. Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 189 U.S. 306, 307 (1903); see also Onondaga Nation v.
Thacher, 61 N.Y.S. 1027, 1028 (1899) (discussing the purpose of the wampum belts).
33. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 11, at 43.
34. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 61-64 (statement of Tom Livesay,
Director, Museum of New Mexico, on behalf of the American Association of Museums,
arguing that housing these objects in museums serves an educational purpose); H.R. REP. No.
101-877, at 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4372 ("Testimony from the museum
community stressed the responsibilities which museums have to maintain their collections and
concern for liability surrounding repatriation.").
[Vol. 72:723
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indefensible and academic cowardice."" Despite the gravity of this issue for
those involved and the protracted nature of ownership disputes, there has been
no specific body of law dealing with the disposition of cultural items. With the
passage of NAGPRA, the disposition of items in federally-funded institutions
will more readily be resolved. Unfortunately, however, the muddled common law
approach will continue to have some influence. The legislation combines some
of its own ownership inventions with principles borrowed from the common
law. 6 Furthermore, the common law will continue to be applicable in disputes
involving private collectors, who are said by some to own the majority of Native
American cultural items,37 and the discovery of cultural items on private lands."
In the absence of an agreement, general principles of personal property law are
the only tools available for legally resolving such disputes and it is to these that
we turn to now.
Most disputes about ownership of cultural property will, in the absence of
some agreement, concern the doctrine of adverse possession. When can the
possessor of a cultural item rest easy knowing that she has proper title and full
ownership rights as against all other claimants? The requirements of adverse
possession of real property, that the possession be adverse, hostile, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous, and last throughout the entire applicable
statutory limitation period,"' are generally held to apply to personal property with
its own set of state statutory limitation periods.4" The statutory limitation periods
for personal property claims are usually only two to five years, rather than the ten
to twenty year periods which govern real property.4 '
There are, however, easily recognizable problems with this extension of the
doctrine of adverse possession. The most notable problem is the notice
requirement, captured in the conditions of open and notorious possession. Open
and notorious possession of personal property is less likely to provide notice to
35. Vicki Quade, Who Owns the Past? An Interview with Walter Echo-Hawk 16 HUM.
RTS., Winter 1989, at 24, 28.
36. The "right of possession" defense is a statutory creation, but it provides for the
application of property law if the normal operation of the defense results in a Fifth Amendment
taking. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) (1994).
37. See Ellen Herscher, International Control Efforts: Are There Any Good Solutions?, in
THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING, supra note 30, at 117, 117-18.
38. See Nichols et al., supra note 30, at 32-33. The authors tell a particularly troubling story
about the Box S site in New Mexico. The Box S site is a 473 room pueblo dating to the mid
and late thirteenth century. It is situated partly on a Zuni reservation and partly on private
lands, and the Zuni regard it as an ancestral site. In 1982, the private property was sold to
developers who started tearing up the site with a back hoe. The Zunis attempted to stop them
by challenging the developers' title to the land in question. The Zunis lost the battle and the
right to stop the destruction of their ancestral site. The destruction continued and the objects
that were unearthed were sold on the antiquities market.
39. Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV.
119, 120 (1988/89); see also R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61
WASH. U. L.Q. 331 (1983) (arguing that there is additionally a subjective element in adverse
possession that looks to the possessor's state of mind).
40. See Gerstenblith, supra note 39, at 120-23.
41. Id. at 121-22 n.10.
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the original owner than is the case with adverse possession of real property. The
jurisprudence has thus for the most part ignored these requirements and, in their
stead, has turned to the good or bad faith of the adverse possessor.42 Someone
who holds personal property adversely but in good faith, often a bona ide
purchaser, is said to hold the property in an "open and notorious" manner, thus
satisfying the notice requirements regardless of the fact the original owner may
have neither actual nor constructive notice.43 Consequently, in any typical legal
dispute over title to personal property, possession of the object in question is
prima facie evidence of ownership: "[p]ossession carries a presumption of
ownership."' On the other hand, a bad faith adverse possessor, typically a thief,
will prevent the limitation period from running. Only evidence of actual notice
to the original owner of the adverse possession will start the limitation period
clock ticking under these circumstances."
John Henry Merryman, one of the most prolific legal academics in the area of
cultural property broadly speaking, appears to support this approach to
ownership of cultural property. He argues that the principle of repose should
govern the allocation of property rights in cultural property: an existing situation
should continue unless there is some significant reason for altering it. In the case
of adverse possession, this will generally operate in favor of the institutions or
individuals in possession.4 6
This approach favoring possessors has been altered in a number of recent cases
concerning the ownership of important works of art. The emphasis has switched
in these cases from the possessor's behavior to the original owner's diligence in
searching for the property. Accordingly, the limitation period does not begin to
run until a diligent owner has actual or constructive notice. In the case of
o 'Keeffe v. Snyder,47 the court settled on a constructive notice test, holding that
the limitation period would not run until a reasonably diligent owner could have
42. Id. at 124-25, 130-31.
43. See, e.g., Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bivens-Corhn Co., 119 P.2d 58, 59 (Okia.
1941) (holding that when property is held "open and notoriously" for more than the statute of
limitations period from the date of the wrongful taking, then the right of action by the owner
is barred); Gatlin v. Vaut, 91 S.W. 38, 40 (Indian Terr. 1905) (holding that the statute of
limitation does not run until property is held in a notorious and open fashion so that the owner
has a reasonable chance of asserting his title and an opportunity of knowing its whereabouts).
44. Hammond v. Halsey, 336 S.E.2d 495, 497 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the
original owner of a Spanish cannon barrel transferred physical possession to an antiquities
society and thus the burden was on his estate to prove superior title).
45. See, e.g., Gatlin, 91 S.W. at 38, 40 (In Gatlin, two mules were stolen from Indian
territory, taken to Texas, and sold to a bona fide purchaser. In a claim for repossession, the
court held that the bona fide purchaser could not tack on the thief's ownership to satisfy the
limitation period because, by removing the mules from the Territory, the thief had prevented
the limitation period from running.).
46. John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1880,
1911 (1985).
47. 405 A.2d 840, 844-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 416 A.2d
862 (1980). The issue of whether O'Keeffe used due diligence in searching for three small
paintings that were stolen in 1946 was submitted for retrial. Before retrial, O'Keeffe and
Snyder settled the matter by dividing the paintings in question.
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discovered the facts necessary to initiate an action.48 The court stated, "[i]f a
display of the chattel is not such as to give notice to the true owner of the
chattel's whereabouts, the latter's claim therefor[e] cannot be barred."49 But in
the case of Menzel v. List5" the court went so far as to require actual notice,
stating that the limitation period on the adverse possession of a Chagall did not
start running until a demand and refusal had been made.51
Under the earlier approach favoring possessors, museums generally had strong
adverse possession claims given that many of them are good faith possessors who
have maintained and preserved Native American cultural objects for well beyond
any statutory limitation period. Furthermore, if a museum detrimentally relied on
an honest belief that they were the rightful owners by sinking significant
resources into preserving and maintaining the object6 in question, this might have
strengthened its claim.52 Neither ignorance with respect to the whereabouts of the
items, at least in-the absence of fraud or concealment,53 nor inability to bring a
lawsuit would have been adequate excuses for failing to challenge a museum's
adverse possession claim. But even under the more recent approach favoring
original owners, federally funded museums and institutions may have strong
claims to their Native American collections. In many cases, it may be easy to
prove the original Indian owners failed to exercise due diligence. In other cases,
although demands were made for certain items thus evidencing actual notice, the
subsequent passage of time has resulted in the expiration of the relevant
limitation period. Presumably, both the lack of due diligence and failure to bring
suit in time stemmed from cultural and economic larriers14 separating Native
Americans from the rest of American society; but, sadly enough, the common law
has traditionally not taken such barriers into account.
There have not been many cases dealing with Native American cultural
patrimony, but the few cases that exist are fine examples of the common law's
48. Id. at 844-45; see also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding
that an original owner's attempt to recover an oil painting by Claude Monet was barred because
she failed to exercise due diligence in looking for it); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church
of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389-91 (S.D. Ind.
1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278, 288-90 (7th Cir. 1990) (The Republic of Cyprus and Church of
Cyprus successfully recovered four Byzantine mosaics from an Indiana art dealer after proving
that they had diligently searched for the mosaics even though they did not do everything they
could have done in locating them.).
49. O'Keeffe, 405 A.2d at 845.
50. 253 N.Y.S.2d 43,44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), on remand, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966).
51. Id. at44. But see DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 ("Where demand and refusal are necessary
to start a limitations period, the demand may not be unreasonably delayed.").
52. See Wilcox v. St. Mary's Univ., Inc., 497 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (The
University spent more than $40,000 to care for documents that it mistakenly thought were
gifts.).
53. See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 345 (1874).
54. S. REP. No. 101-473, at 4 (1990) ("[I]n cases where Native Americans have attempted
to regain items that were inappropriately alienated from their tribes, they have met with
resistance from museums and have lacked the legal ability of [sic] financial resources to pursue
the return of the items.").
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inability to take into account indigenous practices and beliefs. Native American
claims for repossession of their cultural heritage have tended to fail on both
procedural and substantive grounds, despite the fact courts have occasionally
recognized communal ownership rights in accordance with Indian beliefs."5 In the
court battle previously mentioned over numerous wampum belts, the court
acknowledged the significance of the wampum to the Onondaga Nation, but
refused to recognize that they had any property interests over and above those of
a non-Indian good faith purchaser.56 One of the wampum belts in question was
originally owned by the Five Nations, which included the Onondaga." An
Onondaga, who was said to be the authorized "wampum keeper,"" sold the
wampum to the defendant for $500.00. A number of Indians sued for possession
of the wampum as representatives of the Five Nations. They were unsuccessful,
predominantly because the court refused to acknowledge that the Five or Six
Nations "had any active or actual existence." 9 Furthermore, the court held that
the Onondaga Indian who sold the wampum was not under any restraints in his
ownership such that he was not authorized to sell it as he pleased.6 The court
subsequently found it unnecessary to examine the issue of the passing of the
limitation period. But it did apply a version of the demand and refusal rule in
holding that the plaintiffs' failure to formally demand the return of the wampum
also defeated their claim.6
In a more recent case the Chilkat Indian Village Council claimed a "paramount
possessory interest" in "four carved wooden posts and a wooden partition called
a rain screen," described as "the finest examples of native art, either Tlingit or
Tsimshian, in Alaska."'62 The posts and rain screen had been removed by
members of the Village who then sold them to an art dealer, Johnson. The
55. See, e.g., United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80, 82 (1972) (holding whatever title the
Indians have is in the tribe, and not in the individuals, although held by the tribe for the
common use and equal benefit of all the members); Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct.
Cl. 281, 302 (1893), affd, 155 U.S. 196, 208-10 (1894) (recognizing Cherokee Nation land
as "public domain" or "common property" of the Cherokee); Seneca Nation of Indians v.
Hammond, 3 Thomp. & C. 347,348-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874) (holding that an individual Indian
could not sell hemlock bark because the title rested with the Seneca Nation as a whole).
56. Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 61 N.Y.S. 1027, 1032 (1899).
57. The other four members of the Five Nations were the Oneidas, Mohawks, Senecas, and
Cayugas. The Five Nations became the Six Nations with the addition of the Tuscaroras and,
throughout the decision, the court referred to both leagues as the original owners of the
wampum. Id. at 1028.
58. Id. at 1028-29.
59. Id. at 1032.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1029 ("He was a purchaser in good faith and for value and was entitled to the
benefit of a demand before action was brought against him."). This demand and refusal rule is
in keeping with the more traditional cases on adverse possession as it serves to protect the
adverse possessor. The more recent demand and refusal rule previously mentioned protects the
original owner by insuring that the limitation period does not start running until a demand has
been made. See Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
62. Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting




primary hurdle in this case was jurisdictional. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the Village's claim that the defendant took the artifacts in question without the
Village's permission was a claim for conversion which was a matter of state
law.63 It further held that the enforcement of a Village ordinance concerning
ownership and removal of the artifacts against the Indian defendants arose under
tribal law.' Only the question of the enforcement of the ordinance against non-
Indians was held to be a matter of federal law, falling within federal
jurisdiction.6 5 Judge Ferguson, focusing on the significance of the artifacts and
anticipating federal government involvement in entitlement to Native American
cultural property, dissented from the court's decision, stating:
The Village's property right claims do in fact have a basis in federal law...
. Congress has made clear its commitment to protecting Indian property...
[the] safeguarding [of] tribal society as a whole in order to ensure Indian self-
determination. Tribal artifacts are central to cultural identity and the
maintenance of a distinct tribal society. The Village describes its
communally-owned property as playing a central role in the "spiritual,
cultural and social" practices of the Chilkat tribal members. Thus, these
artifacts implicate important Indian and federal interests which provide a
"federal foundation."
66
So there have been jurisdictional and evidentiary problems which have barred
Native American claims to their cultural patrimony even before an examination
of the fundamental issues pertaining to adverse possession. One thing that is
made clear by Onondaga and Chilkat is that Native American claims to repossess
their cultural patrimony are not immune from the relevant state statutory
limitation period for conversion claims, although in neither case was it necessary
to examine the passing of the limitation period. This is in stark contrast to Native
American land claims which are not subject to statutory limitation periods.67
Thus by operation of state law, museums may very well have legal title to Native
American objects of cultural patrimony regardless of who initially alienated them
from the tribe.6"
NAGPRA radically alters this situation by clearly providing a federal cause of
action69 and recognizing tribal ownership of important cultural items.
63. Id. at 1472-73.
64. Id. at 1475-76.
65. Id. at 1474-75.
66. Id. at 1478. The parties to this action eventually settled their dispute and the Tlingit
artifacts were to be returned to Klukwan. Settlement Reached to Return Hlingit Art to Alaskan
Village, THE SEATTLE TIMES, June 28, 1994, available in 1994 WL 3631895.
67. See, e.g., Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 n.13 (1985) ("Under the
Supremacy Clause, state-law time bars, e.g., adverse possession and laches, do not apply of
their own force to Indian land title claims.").
68. See H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 27 (1990) (letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General discussing "takings" implication of the repatriation provisions).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 3013 (1994) ("The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over
any action brought by any person alleging a violation of this chapter and shall have the
authority to issue such orders as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter.").
"Any person" is defined in the legislative history to include an Indian tribe, Native Hawaiian
organization, museum, or agency. S. REP. No. 101-473, at 14 (1990).
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Additionally, the Act alters the requirements of adverse possession by requiring
proof of alienation by someone who had the authority to do so. As previously
mentioned, the authority to alienate cultural patrimony resides exclusively in the
culturally affiliated tribe and disputes over such authority are to be resolved
according to tribal law.70 Thus, good faith possessors under the Act are only
those museums which acquired cultural objects from those who had rightful
ownership and the right to alienate the property in accordance with tribal law: By
dictating the conditions of a legal transfer and sanctioning Native American
interpretations of such transfers, the Act essentially obliterates the operation of
the doctrine of adverse possession.
Furthermore, the burden of proving legal entitlement in accordance with the
'conditions set out in the Act. appears to rest on museums. Under the provisions
for repatriation, if a culturally affiliated tribe introduces evidence that the
museum in question does not have a "right of possession" to a cultural object,
then the museum must return the object "unless it can overcome such inference
and prove that it has a right of possession . *.". . " The burden of proof is
similarly constructed for land claims. Once an Indian has made out a
"presumption of title in himself," by showing previous possession or ownership,
the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the non-Indian claimant.72
It is unclear what type of evidence, besides proof of cultural affiliation,
constitutes prima facie evidence that a museum does not have a right of
possession. Given the impossibility of proving the non-existence of a museum's
documented title, "oral tradition and historical evidence" are likely to be
acceptable in establishing a prima facie case.73 Earlier drafts of the Act more
clearly placed the burden on museums and federal agencies. For example, one
draft stated that "the burden shall be upon the federal agency or museum that has
possession or control of such remains or objects to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the museum has the right of possession to such remains or
objects."relabeled[SCC this quote, author is checking bill]74 Although the present
Act backs away from this more overtly pro-Native American stance, it is
nonetheless designed to assist Native Americans in repatriating their cultural
70. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 11, at 67-68 (discussing the "right of
possession").
71. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c) (1994).
If a known lineal descendant or an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization requests the return of Native American unassociated funerary
objects, sacred objects or objects of cultural patrimony pursuant to this chapter
and presents evidence which, if standing alone before the introduction of
evidence to the contrary, would support a finding that the Federal agency or
museum did not have the right of possession, then such agency or museum shall
return such objects unless it can overcome such inference and prove that it has
a right ofpossession to the objects.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1994).
73. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 11, at 67.
74. H.R. 5237, 101st Cong. § 6(c)(1) (1990).
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heritage when there is little support for a museum's right of possession,
bypassing the nearly impossible hurdles in the common law.7"
It must be noted that the legislation provides a safety valve for those museums
set on retaining their Native American collections. If the operation of the
repatriation provisions and the limited effect of the "right of possession" defense
result in a Fifth Amendment taking then the "'right of possession' shall be as
provided under otherwise applicable property law."76 This quite dramatically
alters the above conclusions, bringing the legislation more closely in line with
existing principles of personal property law. But it would be unwise to put too
much weight on this safety valve. First, the Takings Clause is not implicated in
repatriations from federal public museums and agencies, "as the property in
question is that of the United States and, hence, may be repatriated by
Congress."77 Second, there is the difficulty of proving a "taking," although the
physical removal of the objects would provide a solid basis for a takings claim.78
Third, the overall spirit and operation of the Act favors Native American*
ownership and begins a process of repatriation which museums will find difficult
to resist.79 It is instructive to note that the Attorney General's Office suggested
that private museums be exempt from the repatriation provisions or be permitted
to refuse repatriation if they have "legal title" to the requested objects, in order
75. See Ralph W. Johnson & Sharon I. Haensly, Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of
1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 151, 152-53
(1992). But see Steven Platzman, Comment, Objects of Controversy: The Native American
Right to Repatriation, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 517, 547 (1992) (arguing that the burden of proof
rests on the culturally affiliated tribe).
76. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3005(c), 3001(13) (1994). Human remains and associated funerary objects
are not subject to a "right of possession" defense or a Fifth Amendment Takings exemption.
Id. § 3005(a)(1).
For a comprehensive discussion of the application of Takings Clause jurisprudence to
NAGPRA, see Daniel J. Hurtado, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act:
Does It Subject Museums to an Unconstitutional "Taking"?, 6 HoFSTRA PROP. L.J. 1 (1993)
(arguing that the takings exception in NAGPRA defeats the purpose of the Act and that
repatriation should be exempt from the Takings Clause); see also H.R. REP. No. 10 1-877, at
25-29 (1990) (letter of Bruce C. Navarro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General discussing the
takings implication of an earlier draft of the Act); Johnson & Haensly, supra note 75.
77. H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 25-29 (1990) (letter of Bruce C. Navarro, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General discussing the takings implication of an earlier draft of the Act).
78. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding
that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to
the public interests that it may serve); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (finding that takings are more readily found when the interference is a physical
invasion (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946))).
79. Although continuance of federal funding is conditional upon compliance with the Act,
the federal government may not use its federal spending powers to force museums to engage
in unconstitutional activities. In a letter to Congress, the Attorney General's Office states: "A
strong argument could be made that Congress may not exercise the spending power to
accomplish an uncompensated taking of private property, as such action would contravene the
Constitution." H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 26-27 (letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
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to avoid "Takings clause" implications."0 The fact that the legislature chose the
latter resolution reflects its hope that state and private museums subject to the
Act will cooperate with repatriation requests even when they have legal title."'
Thus, although the legislation provides a technical means of circumventing its
application in those circumstances where repatriation will result in a "taking,"
I suspect that it will rarely be utilized.
The final alteration brought about by the NAGPRA repatriation provisions
concerns costs. Engaging in a legal dispute over entitlement to cultural objects
can be costly. NAGPRA eradicates this cost for Native Americans by providing
federal grants for determining cultural affiliation and to cover the costs of
repatriation.82 Thus not only does the legislation radically shift property
entitlements, it has reallocated the cost of establishing cultural affiliation and the
responsibility for proving entitlement. NAGPRA has effectively created a
presumption in favor of tribal possession of cultural patrimony.
The remainder of this Article is an attempt to find a justification for this
presumption. Why should Native Americans regain possession of their cultural
patrimony? Whether the legislation is viewed as openly altering legal entitlement,
as clarifying who has ownership rights, or as just voicing a forceful change in
federal policy, it effectively alters the pre-NAGPRA situation regarding
entitlement to Native American cultural patrimony.
There are, as previously stated, three answers to this question which I will
explore. One answer relies on external reasons which are not concerned with the
property itself but which focus on other circumstances warranting repatriation.
Under this approach, repatriation is a form of compensation for past wrongs
committed against Native Americans and the theft of Native American cultural
items. The second answer begins with the assumption that NAGPRA is clarifying
ownership rights and mandating the return of property which morally, if not
legally, belongs to Native Americans. The flip-side of this approach is that such
property has never rightfully belonged to the institutions which have possessed
it. The final answer views NAGPRA as creating a special category of property,
immune from the normal operation of property law and the incidents of
ownership, not unlike human remains. This latter approach is perhaps the most
intriguing and compelling, but customary right, one of the ideas discussed in the
second approach, also provides a persuasive justification for repatriation.
80. H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 27 (letter of Bruce C. Navarro, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General).
81. This seems to be the attitude of at least one state museum. Thomas A. Livesay, director
of the Museum of New Mexico, writes: "After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of
repatriation, legal considerations should serve as the lowest common denominator. Ethical and
moral issues are the priorities for the Museum's stance in implementing the federal legislation
on repatriation." Thomas A. Livesay, The Impact of the Federal Repatriation Act on State-
Operated Museums, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 301 (1992).




The return of cultural patrimony to culturally affiliated tribes can easily be
understood as a form of collective compensation. In fact the legislation in general
in its attempt to shift the balance of affairs in favor of Native Americans can be
understood in light of compensatory and human rights objectives. Under this
view, the repatriation of Native American cultural objects is an act of reparation
for past injustices. Accordingly, the Act implicitly acknowledges that Native
Americans have suffered terrible losses and attempts to rectify these losses by
giving tribes the right to reclaim property which was once owned by them. It does
this enabling Native American tribes to claim legal title to cultural patrimony
regardless of the legality of a museum's title. So in at least some cases,
compensation under the Act will take the form of a redistribution of property
rights. Thus, under this view, the return of property is not dictated by principles
of ownership, but is rather the chosen means of compensating Native Americans.
The reallocation is a recognition of the human rights of Native Americans and
the need to compensate them for their sufferings but it is not a direct recognition
of rightful ownership.
It should be made clear here at the outset of this discussion that there are no
provisions for compensating museums who lose their collections. As previously
stated, if such a loss results in a Fifth Amendment "Taking," then the rhuseum
in question is entitled to rely on otherwise applicable private property laws.83 It
is obvious from the inclusion of this provision that the federal government does
not intend systematically to compensate museums for repatriated items. Having
said this, however, it does appear that some assistance in the form of grants for
the creation of replicas may be provided to soften the blow of a significant loss.84
Congress appears to have had compensation for Native Americans in mind
when it passed NAGPRA. NAGPRA was quite clearly conceived as human rights
legislation.85 It was designed to rectify the violations of the "civil rights of
America's first citizens."8" Congress pursued this human rights initiative by
legislatively encouraging a dialogue between museums and Native American
tribes which it apparently hopes will lead to some form of settlement or
compensation, not necessarily the return of the property in question. 7 As stated
by Senator Inouye, "[flor museums and institutions which have consistently
ignored the requests of Native Americans, this legislation will give Native
Americans greater ability to negotiate.""8 By placing Native Americans in a better
83.25 U.S.C. §§ 3001(13), 3005(c) (1994).
84. See Museum Set to Lose Indian Treasure, supra note 1.
85. The human rights dimension of the legislation is the focus of the Report of the Panel
for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American Relations (Feb. 28, 1990), reprinted in
24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 487, at 494-95 (1992) ("The Panel believes that human rights should be the
paramount principle where claims are made by Native American groups that have a cultural
affiliation with remains and other materials.").
86. 136 CONG. REc. S17174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
87. See S. REP. NO. 101-473, at 17, 22-23 (1990).
88. 136 CONG. REc. S17174-17175 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
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bargaining position and forcing museums to negotiate, Congress clearly hopes
that some of the wrongs committed in the past will be rectified.
But it is important to realize precisely how Congress has affected the
respective bargaining positions of museums and Native Americans. NAGPRA
has done this by altering the rules regarding ownership of cultural items,
particularly cultural patrimony. It clearly establishes tribal property interests in
cultural patrimony. In some cases tribes may use their property interests to
negotiate lucrative settlements, allowing museums to keep the cultural patrimony
in question. 9 But in others, the form of compensation generated by NAGPRA
will be the return of cultural patrimony; the return of property once owned by the
tribe. In Barre, Massachusetts, for example, the Oglala Sioux are exercising their
rights to reclaim the museum's collection. The Sioux have apparently agreed to
replace the cultural items with handcrafted replicas, but they most definitely want
possession of, not compensation for, the original Wounded Knee relics.9"
Compensation is certainly a laudatory objective, but can such an objective
justify the redistribution of property rights as dictated in NAGPRA? Jeremy
Waldron argues that compensatory measures which seek to correct an historic
injustice and reinstate a situation that would have prevailed had the injustice not
occurred are morally unstable. Reparations for historic injustices which are
"merely symbolic" are morally acceptable and apparently should be encouraged.
They serve as a form of public recognition of the injustice and "help sustain a
dignified sense of identity-in-memory for the people affected."'" But, according
to Waldron, full compensation for past injustices presents three problems.
First, it forces us to engage in a "counterfactual approach to reparations" which
presents us with the impossible task of determining what individuals or groups
would have done given freedom or a real choice.92 This argument seems to boil
down to the adage that we can't turn back the clock. We cannot determine
retrospectively what individuals or tribes would have done with the property had
they retained it or been in better bargaining positions and so we cannot assume
that given freedom of choice they would have acted rationally, either retaining
the property or securing its fair market value. Waldron recognizes that we do
employ counterfactuals in "evaluating the entire basic structure of a society" as
this is the foundation for contractarian theories of justice but rejects them in
"evaluating some particular distribution among a subset of its members."93
There appear to be at least two problems with this argument. First, we do use
counterfactuals to affect particular distributions. One example of this is
expectation damages. Compensation for an accident or breach of contract seeks
to minimize losses which arise out of the diminishment of reasonable
expectations, in addition to actual expenditures. In awarding expectation
89. Some of the objects in question are very valuable. A private art dealer testified that a
war shirt in good condition with scalp locks could be sold for $200,000 on the open market.
H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 13 (1990); see also De Meo, supra note 30, at 8-10 (noting the
increasing value of Native American objects in the international art market).
90. Museum Set to Lose Indian Treasure, supra note 1, at A12.





damages, the court is assuming that had the accident or breach not occurred, a
reasonable person would have acted in a certain way of which she is no longer
capable. The statutory limitation periods for tort and contract actions serve to
contain the use of such counterfactuals to relatively recent events, thus setting
apart injustices that occurred a long time ago. But the point still holds that under
certain circumstances, we do rely on counterfactuals to redistribute property.94
More significantly, Waldron's first concern undervalues freedom of choice.
Reparations for acts of injustice, whether historic or recent, serve two purposes.
First, they rectify a wrongful loss. Second, they serve as a reminder that under
certain circumstances we will not tolerate a restriction of freedom of choice.
Waldron fails to recognize the significance of this second goal. When someone
harms us, we are as frustrated and offended by our resulting inability to make
certain choices as we are by the actual losses arising out of our changed
circumstances. Native Americans are as aggrieved that they can no longer choose
what to do with property that was rightfully theirs as by the loss itself.
Reparations serve to remedy both of these injuries. By focusing on the problems
of isolating what choices would have been made had the injustice not occurred,
Waldron fails to see the significance of the act of choosing itself. It is morally
significant that one's freedom to choose a certain course of action is seriously
curtailed even if Waldron is correct in asserting that the various choices that
could have been made are morally insignificant.
The second problem discussed by Waldron is more convincing. He argues that
compensating a tribe for the wrongful loss of their property entails that they are
still entitled to the property in question and yet it is not so clear that this is true.95
That they were once entitled to the property is not in issue, but the passage of
time may "fade" this entitlement. Entitlement "fades," he argues, because
expectations decrease. 96 He states that "[i]f something was taken from me
decades ago, the claim that it now forms the center of my life and that it is still
indispensable to the exercise of my autonomy is much less credible."9 As time
passes both interest and attachment wane for those who no longer have contact
with the property. Conversely, the interests of those in possession grow. It may
seem "harsh," he recognizes, that dispossession weakens one's entitlement, but
94. For a persuasive counter-argument to Waldron's observations on the problems of
counterfactual judgments, see A. John Simmons, Historical Rights and Fair Shares, 14 LAW
& PHIL. 149, 157-59 (1995) (arguing that counterfactual judgments are not "theoretically
insuperable" if we assume, as we inevitably do in making most moral judgments, rational
choices).
95. Waldron, supra note 91, at 15.
96. Id. at 16. Waldron's understanding of "expectation" appears to rely on the notion of
control. Waldron states, "If a person controls a resource over a long enough period, then he and
others may organize their lives and their economic activity around the premise that that
resource is 'hers,' without much regard to the distant provenance of her entitlement." Id. But
in the case of cultural patrimony in the possession of federally funded museums, those whose
expectations are at stake are both those who own and manage the museum collection in
addition to those who have ready access to the museum exhibit. These expectations may be of
a limited sort, both because of the nature of the objects and because of the restricted forms of
connection, but are nonetheless expectations worth considering.
97. Id. at 18-19.
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
it is a widely accepted moral phenomenon and is reflected in various legal
doctrines, not the least of which is the doctrine of adverse possession.98
Limitation periods and the equitable doctrine of laches also recognize the
growing interests of those in possession and the need for some security of title.99
This argument does not, however, account for the effect of qualitatively
different attachments. It may be the case that under certain circumstances and
with respect to specific property, attachments do not wane and expectations do
not decrease. The unique, culturally specific relationship Native Americans have
with their cultural patrimony may nurture ongoing expectations and prevent the
weakening of expectations with the passage of time. 0 Waldron briefly
acknowledges the possibility of this occurring when the object or land in
question is important to the tribe's "sense of identity as a community,"'0 ' but he
mentions this only in passing and seems to minimize its relevance. Furthermore,
it is at least arguable that the struggle and desire to regain ownership of property
itself intensifies the significance of certain objects, even if only symbolically,
thus preserving entitlement. Waldron dismisses this argument, stating that this
is not the same as the basis for original entitlement, but he provides no further
explanation for rejecting its relevance. 2
Waldron's third argument against reparations for historic injustices is that
injustices can be superseded by a change in circumstances: "one and the same
type of action may be injustice in one set of circumstances and not injustice in
another."'0 3 Thus, although it may have been wrong given the circumstances to
misappropriate tribal property, we should not assume that it would be wrong to
take it from them now given a completely different set of circumstances.
Waldron clarifies that this is not simply a matter of the passage of time."' In
order for an injustice to be superseded, there must be an actual change in
circumstances. For example, a rapidly increasing population "might justify our
forcing the aboriginal inhabitants of some territory to share their land with
others."'0 5 Thus, although it was originally wrong to take it from them, this
injustice is superseded by the fact it would not be wrong to take it from them
now.
Waldron's observations about the possibility of superseding past injustices are
debatable. Even if there are present circumstances which justify the removal of
cultural patrimony from its tribal context, it would be odd if such circumstances
98. Id. at 15-16.
99. For example, as previously discussed, a victim's claim to stolen art objects may be
barred by either a statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches if she fails to exercise due
diligence in seeking the whereabouts and return of the object. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836
F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (barring an original owner's attempt to recover a Monet because she
failed to exercise due diligence in looking for it).
100. For the moment, I am disregarding the issue of qualitatively different attachments which
are morally unsound, such as those which stem from greed or fetishism. See infra text
accompanying notes 143-44.
101. Waldron, supra note 91, at 19.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id. at 25.
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seriously affected the fact of an injustice in the past and our responsibility to do
something about it. But more importantly, Waldron's third criticism of
reparations gets us nowhere; it merely begs the question under what
circumstances is it morally acceptable to compensate Native Americans for the
loss of their property. Is it the case that the need to preserve the past and to
educate non-Native Americans in the ways of tribal life are circumstances that
justify placing cultural patrimony in public museums? Do these circumstances
supersede the historic injustice perpetrated when the property was initially
removed from its culturally affiliated tribe? Waldron's observations provide no
guidelines for answering these crucial questions. His argument is tantamount to
the statement it is unjust to compensate tribes for the loss of their property when
the circumstances of justice indicate so. We still have to determine which
circumstances are morally significant.
Waldron's arguments against full reparations for historic injustices are not
convincing, but this is not to say that we should rely solely on a compensatory
objective to justify the return of cultural patrimony. Although we can construct
an argument supporting Native American entitlement to cultural patrimony, such
an argument depends on identifying a special connection between tribes and their
cultural patrimony. In the absence of a strong, special connection, a
compensatory objective or a desire to rectify wrongs that occurred in the past is
insufficient to justify the return of cultural patrimony when there are legitimate,
intervening claims. Innocent third parties and subsequent holders have developed
their own interests in cultural patrimony; they have built-up expectations relying
on unencumbered ownership rights; they have become emotionally attached to
such objects. It is the existence of intervening claims arising out of such
attachments which make it difficult to rely solely on a compensatory objective.
These intervening claims do not necessarily supersede past injustices but they do
require us to be precise about the value of cultural property to Native Americans.
To justify repatriation as a form of compensation it is necessary to argue that
there is a unique connection between Native Americans and cultural patrimony,
a connection which is both stronger and more significant than a non-Native
American attachment.
Thus, the redistribution of cultural patrimony cannot be justified as a
straightforward matter of compensation. The fact that such property was
wrongfully taken from Native Americans is not by itself a sufficient reason to
return it. Although this may have been the primary objective and justification for
the NAGPRA repatriation provisions, it is not adequate unless we can identify
something unique which creates an irreducible bond between cultural property
and culturally affiliated tribes.
In the next Part, I examine arguments which might explain this unique
connection and in doing so help justify Native American ownership claims.
IV. OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PATRIMONY: EFFICIENCY,
IDENTITY, AND COMMUNITY
Ownership claims are typically extinguished after the passage of a significant
amount of time and this is thought to be justifiable on any number of theories of
ownership. But these same theories might sanction lingering ownership claims
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if indeed there is a recognized incommensurability in how competing groups or
individuals value a particular object. In the Part which follows, I will look at
three theories of ownership which may recognize and accommodate the unique
relationship between Native Americans and their cultural property.
A. Efficiency
It is commonly understood that government regulation of property rights is
justifiable if it corrects an obvious imperfection or imbalance in the open market.
Thus, government intervention in industries-that are prone to natural monopolies
or susceptible to holdouts is generally thought to be acceptable. Government
regulation of the ownership of cultural patrimony may therefore be justified on
the grounds that the market in such objects is somehow imperfect and that it is
more efficient for cultural patrimony to be owned by culturally affiliated Native
American tribes. Given the fact that NAGPRA will in some circumstances negate
non-Indian property rights developed under state law, an efficiency argument
will also have to account for the inefficiencies generated by upsetting certainty
of title. In the following discussion, I will assess the efficiency-based reasons for
recognizing Native American ownership of cultural patrimony. At the end of this
discussion, I will also suggest why such reasons override a general interest in
certainty of title.
One of the most prominent and frequently cited efficiency explanations for the
predominance of a private property regime is the notion of the "tragedy of the
commons."' 6 Harold Demsetz argues that private property arose to correct the
inefficient use of land and resources, the well-known "tragedy of the
commons."'0 7 Because the costs of taking precautions with respect to the
maintenance of a resource are higher than the benefit to be gained by an
individual when the property is communally used, no one takes precautions and
resources are exhausted. The concentration of benefits on a private owner creates
an incentive to use the resource efficiently. Once the resource in question is in
106. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
107. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
Ernest Beaglehole describes a story told to him by a Hopi about the division of land between
the clans which provides a useful example of Demsetz's argument:
Coyote was the first clan here .... Then other clans came. Land was not
divided up, it was free for all to use and cultivate. Certain lands were better than
others, they had better soil and were closer to water, so that trouble soon arose.
Each began to cultivate near the best land. It grew crowded there. Quarrels arose
and killings. It got so bad that the clans came to Coyote clan and asked that clan
to make rules for the land to prevent further trouble. Coyote clan agreed and
asked the swift little fox (coyote) to settle the trouble.... He went around the
land dividing it up ... for all the clans and all the villages. Between the fields of
each clan and of each village, the fox marked off a space twenty feet wide saying
that if a man cultivated this waste land he would go blind, he would be poisoned
and die. The fox gave the same size land to each clan and each clan and village
was told to keep to its own fields. He reported what he had done to the people
and there was no trouble after this.
Beaglehole, supra note 6, at 311-12.
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private hands the market then takes over to generate the most efficient allocation.
Assuming that a tribal interest in cultural patrimony can be expressed through the
market, the tribe or other entity which most values the property in question and
which is thought to be the most efficient owner is presumed to be the one willing
to pay the most. The market and supporting common law rules are thus said to be
the most efficient regulators of property rights.
So what efficiency reasons are there for the government regulation of
ownership rights? Why should the federal government declare that cultural
patrimony is inalienable by an individual and recognize tribal ownership thus
negating other property interests? One reason which typically justifies restricting
property rights is the existence of externalities °8 which "prevent the market from
achieving an efficient result."' 0 9
Calabresi and Melamed argue that one type of external cost.that might be
prevented by inalienability restrictions is large-scale social costs."0 Social costs
arise when there are a significant number of people affected by a single
transaction and the costs of internalizing their interests are both too high and too
difficult to ascertain. Calabresi and Melamed use the example of pollution. If X
wants to sell his property to a polluter, X's neighbors will be significantly harmed
by the sale. X could pay a sum to his neighbor Yto account for the devaluation
of Y's property, and such sum could be accounted for in the sale of X's property
but there may be many Ys and it may be difficult to determine their identities.
Finally, there may be so many Ys that compensation would be too costly in which
case "[b]arring the sale to polluters will be the most efficient result because it is
clear that avoiding pollution is cheaper than paying its costs."'
'
The other externality identified by Calabresi and Melamed is "moralisms."
Assuming that a monetary value can be assigned to people's moral tenets,
moralisms arise when a transaction fosters public moral indignation. Thus, if X
wishes to sell himself into slavery, the moral costs suffered by those who
strongly disagree with slavery are external costs of the slavery transaction."
2
Internalizing these costs through a property rule"' is hindered by the difficulty
of identifying all the objectors, and a liability rule"' is foiled by both the number
108. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 931, 937-41, 951-53 (1985). The other efficiency concerns discussed by Rose-
Ackerman are free riders, coordination problems (prisoner's dilemma), and the cost of
administering alternative policies. See also Richard A. Epstein, hy Restrain Alienation?, 85
CoLum. L. REV. 970 (1985).
109. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. RaV. 1849, 1863 (1987).
110. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972).
111. Id.
112. Id at 1112.
113. "An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes
to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller." Id. at 1092.
114. "Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an
objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule." Id.
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of objectors and the fact that such an external cost "does not lend itself to an
acceptable objective measurement."".5
Large-scale social costs and moralisms are both implicated in cultural
patrimony transactions. Native Americans are harmed by the transfer of cultural
patrimony to non-tribal members; such transfers may have a negative impact on
tribal life and lead to moral indignation within and perhaps even outside Native
American communities. Tribal culture and a Native American way of life is,
accordingly, a "capital asset" that is prone to diminish as aspects of tribal culture
are alienated from the tribe. In the case of cultural patrimony, we can refer to
these external costs as "ethnic externalities." "6 Compensating those affected or
buying them out is potentially prohibitive and the harm is, in any event, not easily
susceptible to "objective measurement."
Ethnic externalities are more pronounced in tribal land transactions. The
alienation of tribal lands to non-members, specifically non-Indians, is bound to
undermine tribal life and the security of tribal existence.' Although an artifact
may not be as important, it may very well be a potent cultural symbol,
particularly in the turbulent wake of Euro-American culture. This is arguably true
of tribal art work, sacred objects," 8 and items which are of historical
significance," 9 although many important objects defy such easy categorization.2
The transfer of cultural patrimony to non-members of the tribe diminishes tribal
power' 2 ' and the strength of tribal tradition. These costs are almost impossible
to account for. Restricting ownership can thus be understood as an attempt to
prevent these costs from arising. If the tribe as a whole owns objects of cultural
patrimony then any ultimate sale will reflect the value of the object to the tribe
as a whole.
One might be tempted to believe that government restrictions on the ownership
of tribal lands and cultural patrimony are primarily paternalistic. 2 Federally
imposed restraints on land transfers are arguably more paternalistic because they
force Native Americans to retain their property even if the tribe as a whole
115. Id. at 1112.
116. See Fred McChesney, Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic
Externalities and Bureaucratic Budgets, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES, supra
note 6, at 109-11.
117. Id. at 120. McChesney raises this argument in his discussion of the possible virtues of
the federal government's role as trustee of Native American land. The preservation of a way
of life, as he points out, may require restrictions on private ownership. This issue is at present
at the forefront of the debate over alienation restrictions on Alaskan lands. See Martha
Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate
Form, 101 YALE L.J. 1331 (1992).
118. The Zuni War Gods, for example, are carved wooden figures which are left in specific
places in the mountains for ritual purposes. To remove them is not only theft and sacrilege but
further is said to rob the Gods of their powers. See Nichols et al., supra note 30, at 33.
119. The Wampum belts of the Iroquois are said to capture the existence. See Blair, supra
note 3 1, at 126-27 (relying on the views of Onondaga Chief Oren Lyons).
120. Strickland, supra note 9, at 184.
121. Id. at 183-84.
122. Paternalistic reasons for ownership restrictions can also be understood as efficiency
reasons. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 110, at 1113-14.
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desires to alienate it. A consensus has grown, however, amongst federal
policymakers that federal restraints on the alienation of tribal land holdings do
not stem from an undesirable paternalism designed to protect Indians from their
own improvidence, but rather from the view that a substantial land base is
essential to the preservation of a tribal way of life: "[t]he continued enforcement
of federal restrictions, in this view, derives not from a presumed incompetence
of the 'ward' but from a perceived value in the desirability of a separate Indian
culture and polity."'" Given that this argument can also be applied to cultural
patrimony ownership restrictions, perhaps we can dismiss paternalism as a reason
for government action. 24
So far we have determined that ethnic externalities provide a legitimate reason
for restricting ownership of cultural patrimony. A further efficiency problem
prevented by ownership restrictions is the possibility of a holdout. Holdouts
occur when there is something unique and significant about the property to a
specific group or when it is specifically required for an alternative use. These
features make the property "subject to private rent-seeking":'12 private owners
are capable of demanding prices that are well above the market value of the
property. With respect to cultural patrimony, non-Native American owners could
demand exorbitantly high prices for objects that are irreplaceable to Native
Americans. NAGPRA prevents this private rent-seeking by creating a
presumption of tribal ownership.
Thus it appears that the presumption of Native American ownership can be
justified on efficiency grounds. Native American ownership minimizes external
costs and prevents the possible occurrence of holdouts. But can tribal
communities efficiently manage and care for cultural patrimony? The
circumstances which give rise to "ethnic externalities," in particular the cultural
significance of the objects and the communal benefits generated from access and
use, should, at least theoretically, also provide incentives to preserve and protect
cultural patrimony. But opponents of a presumption of Native American
ownership argue that this is not sufficient. The preservation of cultural objects
usually requires both funding and knowledge which often do not coincide with
a desire to retain the objects. It is this separation of interest from ability to
preserve which fuels the international debate on cultural patrimony. Those who
argue against the retentive laws of third world countries, rich in cultural
patrimony, do so partially on the basis of the supposed inability of these
countries to properly care for their cultural patrimony.'26
123. COHEN, supra note 6, at 510.
124. Margaret Radin, however, argues that the moralism-extemality argument merges into
paternalism: "[b]y imposing paternalistic restraints, we are benefiting those people whose
subjective moral beliefs include the 'knowledge' that others would be better off if restrained,
and who attach subjective value to seeing them better off." Radin, supra note 109, at 1866,
n.59. According to this argument, it is hard to escape the conclusion that there are paternalistic
reasons at work.
125. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 758-60 (1986).
126. See John Henry Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
477,506-08, 511-12 (1988).
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But this is a disingenuous argument. There is no basis for believing that the
knowledge possessed by non-affiliated groups is better than that held by
affiliated groups. Although established museums may have greater scientific
knowledge which aids in actual preservation, it is not always the case that this
type of knowledge is the most appropriate. Affiliated groups naturally have a
better sense of what is appropriate and respectful. In fact many disputes between
Native American groups and museums have erupted over inappropriate, at times
even sacrilegious, treatment of objects. The lack of funding is also a weak
argument against Native American possession given the prominent role of
government funds in the maintenance of museums, in particular those museums
subject to NAGPRA. Some portion of government funding which goes to
museums could be diverted to Native American tribes for the purpose of caring
for cultural property. Finally, in general there is no foundation for believing that
tribes will abuse their ownership rights by neglecting property once they have
gone through the trouble of repatriating it.
The final efficiency issue to be addressed is should the efficiencies of tribal
ownership outweigh the inefficiencies generated by instability of title? Although
NAGPRA recognizes tribal ownership and may do so for efficiency reasons,
those in possession of cultural patrimony have operated under the assumption
that they are the rightful, legal owners. Upsetting this assumption creates
significant uncertainties amongst those in possession of Native American
artifacts. But there are at least two considerations which mitigate this problem.
First, the total number of objects of cultural patrimony is likely to be relatively
small. Only a few items will likely satisfy the requirement of "ongoing historical,
traditional, or cultural importance central to the'Native American group or
culture itself."' 27 Thus the effects of the NAGPRA cultural patrimony provisions
should be minimal. Secondly, and more importantly, museums are entitled to rely
on their assumption of legal title if repatriation results in Fifth Amendment
Takings.'28 This safety valve permits the federal government to recognize Native
American ownership without seriously disrupting those museums that do not
wish to cooperate. Certainty of title will thus not be seriously undermined given
that repatriation is voluntary when there is proof of an otherwise legal title.
Thus it is not difficult to construct an efficiency justification for repatriation.
The problems of "ethnic externalities" and holdouts arguably make tribal
ownership the most efficient form of ownership. But this is not a wholly
satisfactory place to rest our case for repatriation. The efficiency arguments
outlined above take for granted that the property is more valuable to Native
Americans. The discussion of "ethnic externalities" alludes to some reasons why
this is the case but more extensive exploration is necessary. As one may recall,
the compensation argument failed in the end because specific compensation is
not morally justified unless the property has some highly unique connection to
the tribe in question-a connection which neither diminishes as time passes nor
is replicable in other ownership situations. When these circumstances are
present, it is this unique connection and not compensation which provides the
127. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (1994).
128. See id. § 3001(13).
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real basis for repatriation. The same can be said of the "ethnic externality"
argument. The existence of "ethnic externalities" shifts the focus from efficiency
to the unique connection which gives rise to such externalities. The concept of
a cultural externality hinges on a vague and likely complex cultural connection
between a tribe and its cultural patrimony. This connection must be explored if
we are to arrive at a complete justification for the return of cultural patrimony.
In the remainder of this Part, I will examine two reasons why cultural
patrimony is more valuable to Native Americans. The first reason is that cultural
patrimony may be said to be constitutive of cultural identity.29 Although this
argument has been used by others to justify repatriation of cultural patrimony,
it turns out to be both incoherent and incapable of justifying repatriation. The
second reason draws on the common law notion of inherently public property. 30
According to this argument, cultural patrimony may be like publicly held
commons or recreational property in that its publicness increases its value within
a specific community.
B. Identity and Property
Margaret Radin has argued, as have many others before her, that people need
to have some control over resources external to them for proper self-development
and this is effected through property rights.'3' Most of these property rights are
sufficiently protected by a property rule which prevents forced transfers but
permits voluntary alienation, usually through the market.' But there may be
certain items that are of such great importance to an individual that a property
rule does not provide sufficient protection. These things are, according to Radin,
items which we might consider being constitutive of individual identity, or
"personal property." The essential features of "personal property" are that it be
substantially bound up with individual identity and that its retention does not
result in "bad object relation."'3 Property of this sort might be a home, an
heirloom, or perhaps something more mundane, such as a car.'34 If, according to
Radin, we recognize some property as being essential to personal identity then
we should protect it against cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims.
This argument is used to support the market regulation of certain goods, for
example residential accommodations,'35 babies, 3 6 and body parts.'
129. The discussion of property and identity will rely predominantly on Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982), and a note extending her
theory to the ownership of cultural patrimony, John Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural
Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179 (1989).
130. The discussion of inherently public property will rely primarily on the work of Carol
Rose, supra note 125.
13 1. Radin, supra note 129, at 957.
132. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 110, at 1092.
133. Radin, supra note 129, at 968-69.
134. Relatively mundane objects that are neither unique nor central to one's well-being may
violate the prohibition against "bad object relations."
135. See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUBL. AFF. 350 (1986).
136. See Radin, supra note 109, at 1925-36.
137. See infra text accompanying note 212.
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Disregarding for the moment any trouble spots in Radin's argument, can it be
extended to the ownership of property by groups? Is it the case that some
property is so vital to the well-being and preservation of a particular cultural
community that it can be said to be constitutive of the identity of that cultural
group? This question has been examined in a Note on the Parthenon Marbles by
John Moustakas."38 Moustakas begins with the assumption that cultural groups
have an intrinsic right to exist. He then argues that just as individuals have
protected claims to those goods which are essential to their well-being and
development, so groups have a corresponding entitlement to those goods which
promote "grouphood." Moustakas states: "[tihe notion that groups have intrinsic
rights to exist, develop, flourish and perpetuate themselves, and that these rights
often are intertwined with groups' relations to history and objects, justifies both
creating a category of property which promotes grouphood and distinguishing
between that property and merely fungible property."'
' 39
Moustakas argues that objects that serve as historical records or that are strong
cultural symbols promote "grouphood." Such property is substantially bound up
with group identity and to interfere with group control of it undermines the
group's existence and well-being. 40 This justifies the repatriation of most
cultural patrimony, including most Native American cultural patrimony. Thus in
the absence of a clear and legitimate transfer by the tribe, the concept of
"property for grouphood" provides a sufficient reason to override other
potentially legitimate but less intimate interests. But Moustakas goes one step
further arguing that cultural patrimony which can be said to be "property for
grouphood" should be strictly inalienable; it should never be separated from its
affiliated group even if the group itself decides the property is no longer of any
value. Moustakas states there are:
[a]t least three reasons which explain why grouphood property demands
absolute restraints on alienation .... First, all the factors supporting [the
importance of cultural patrimony to a community] depend upon actual
possession of the very thing itself.... Second,... [cultural patrimony items]
are nonreplenishable resources .... Third, intergenerational justice demands
the prohibition of any transfers .... [A] transfer of grouphood property by
currently ascertained members necessarily alienates the unascertained
members from their own identity.14'
Thus Moustakas is in favor of returning the Parthenon Marbles which were
arguably legally removed from the Parthenon,' 42 and he would argue against the
inclusion of a right of possession defense with respect to cultural patrimony in
NAGPRA.
There are, however, problems with Moustakas's argument. To begin with, the
notion of "bad object relations" or fetishism is insufficiently dealt with, both in
138. Moustakas, supra note 129.
139. Id. at 1185.
140. Id. at 1192-93, 1196-1201 (discussing whether the Parthenon Marbles qualify as
"property for grouphood").
141. Id. at 1207-09.
142. See Merryman, supra note 46, at 1895-1902 (arguing that the Elgin Marbles were
legally removed from the Parthenon).
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Radin's original article and in Moustakas's extension. As Moustakas recognizes,
Radin views "bad object relations" as merely an intuitive concept. We know,
according to Radin and Moustakas, that a "bad object relation" exists when an
"objective moral consensus would agree that being bound up with [the object]
is incompatible with personhood."'43 But drawing the line between "healthy" and
"fetishistic" object relations is not an easy task. Radin seems to think that the
task is made possible by the introduction of an "objective moral consensus"'" but
her entire argument for the existence of "personal property" relies on recognizing
and elevating the subjective element in property ownership. The whole notion of
property being constitutive of identity must rely on a subjective, personal
assessment of possession if it is to have any real force or legitimacy. The
introduction of an objective test separating personhood or grouphood property
from fungible property creates an arbitrary division and potentially undermines
Radin's primary argument for the special treatment of property that is essential
to identity.
The problems of determining when an object relation is fetishistic are
magnified when dealing with different cultures. The possibility of arriving at an
acceptable "objective" assessment of when a claimed special attachment is
fetishistic is at most slim. Native American tribes will forcefully claim that a
wampum belt is essential to their tribal identity even if it is the one-hundredth or
a very poor example of its kind. And the museum community will wish to dispute
such a claim if they desire to keep the wampum belt. There are simply no
reasonable internal limitations to the category of cultural patrimony as property
for grouphood in the absence of an objective test. However, no objective test is
going to be acceptable across cultural borders nor in keeping with the arguments
supporting property for grouphood.
Secondly, it is difficult to see why possession is so essential to Moustakas's
argument. Moustakas states emphatically that his whole argument depends on
actual possession 45 but this seems to be at the very least overstated. It may be the
case that with respect to personal property owned by individuals, possession and
the ability to exclude others is essential at the very least to guarantee access.
Furthermore, most personally owned objects serve some useful function which
often requires constant or at least predictable access. But this is not the case with
respect to cultural patrimony unless the object in question continues to have a
functional purpose. It is difficult to see how a wampum belt is less a part of tribal
identity when it resides in the Smithsonian than when" it is placed within the full
control of its original tribal owners. In fact, it may be the case that constant
external recognition of the tribal origin of an object reinforces its tribal
connection. Moustakas's argument may provide the basis for tribal input into the
display of Native American cultural patrimony, but full possession seems to be
unwarranted. 146 Recognizing the right of Native American tribes to hold property
143. Moustakas, supra note 129, at 1189.
144. Radin, supra note 129, at 969 (emphasis added).
145. Moustakas, supra note 129, at 1208.
146. The relationship of an artist to her work of art, after it has been sold or given to
someone else, is often treated in this manner. Artists are sometimes said, particularly in civil
law countries, to retain "moral rights" in their works of art. An artist should be given some say
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may be essential to tribal identity but this is something quite different from
Moustakas's argument. The right not to be excluded from the class of property-
holders and the link between this and identity is wholly different from
Moustakas's link between objects themselves and cultural identity. 47
Finally, it is difficult to argue that certain objects are essential to group identity
when they have been separated from the group for, in some cases, centuries. The
logical conclusion of Moustakas's argument for return of the Parthenon Marbles
is that the Greeks are soriiehow less Greek now and have been ever since Lord
Elgin removed the Marbles. If the Greeks are as Greek as they have ever been,
however it is that one defines being Greek, it must be the case that either the
Parthenon Marbles are not part of their identity in any real sense of that word or
that possession of the Marbles is not necessary for them to continue to be strong
cultural symbols. In either case Moustakas's argument fails.
There is undoubtedly something intuitively appealing about the notion of
cultural property being intricately tied to, although not constitutive of, cultural
identity. There is also something sensible about requiring that ownership be
inalienable; the assumption behind repatriation is that the objects should never
have left their original context. 48 To return the objects only to have them sold
again in the next generation, or perhaps even sooner, makes a mockery of the
process and the sacrifice of those individuals and institutions whose property
interests are negated by repatriation. But the notion that identity, whether
individual or group, must forever remain attached to a particular object is
unsettling. An immutable, intrinsic connection between identity and property may
unduly limit, at least in theory, an ongoing process of cultural redefinition.
Hegel, the primary source for Radin's theory of property as personhood, would
most certainly object to Moustakas's inalienability requirement. Hegel's notion
of "embodiment" hinges on an act offree will. It is one's will which is embodied
in an object in the external world. Only through the assertive, positive force of
the will does an object become part of one's personality. The imposition of an
inalienability requirement which ignores the will of a community desiring to rid
itself of a certain object runs contrary to the initial premise of the theory
connecting identity and property. 49 These objections to Moustakas's approach,
in addition to the problems outlined above, lead to the conclusion that we must
in what becomes of his works "since they are the material and publicly visible fruit of his
emotions, vision of the world and personality." Quentin Byrne-Sutton, The Owner of a Work
of Visual Art and the Artist: Potential Conflict of Interests, in INTERESTS IN GOODS 281, 287
(Norman Palmer & Ewan McKendrick eds., 1993); see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 143-44 (1987); John Henry Merryman,
The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023-28 (1976).
147. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RiGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 20-21 (1988) ("[Tihe claim
not to be ruled out of the class of people who may own property... of course, does not
guarantee that anyone ... will actually get to be an owner .... ") (emphasis in original).
148. It is important to remember that NAGPRA does not consider cultural patrimony
inalienable but consent of the tribe as a whole is required for a legitimate transfer. 25 U.S.C.
§ 3001(3)(D) (1994).
149. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 67-70 (1990); WALDRON, supra note
147, at 360-61, 363-65.
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search elsewhere for an adequate explanation of the specific value of cultural
patrimony and its subsequent repatriation.
C. Community and Property
1. Public Property
At the height of nineteenth-century industrialism and its near religious
addiction to the institution of private property, a few English intellectuals 5 '
began to worry about the destruction of England's great historical monuments.
Prior to this movement for preservation, the ancient sites in England, according
to the work of Joseph Sax, were considered nothing but nuisances: "just mounds,
ditches, or piles of stone with neither aesthetic nor utilitarian value."'' As one
English gentleman put it: "[a]re the 'absurd relics' of our 'barbarian
predecessors' who 'found time hanging heavily on their hands and set about
piling up great barrows and rings of stones' really to be preserved, and that at the
cost of infringement of property rights?"'52
The change in attitude, according to Sax, stemmed from a realization that
although these great monuments were and would continue to be private property,
there was something public about them, something that belonged to all English
people and that was worth preserving for the nation.' Although the notion of
public ownership appears to be the predominant idea behind the Lubbock Bill,
England's first attempt at historic monuments preservation,'" there was another
idea which bolstered the preservation movement. John Ruskin believed that great
monuments and historical artifacts were creations of human genius that no one
had a right to destroy.'55 He stated:
What we have ourselves built, we are at liberty to throw down; but what other
men gave their strength and wealth and life to accomplish, their right does not
pass away with their death: still less is the right to the use of what they have
left vested in us only. It belongs to all their successors." 6
150. The most notable is John Ruskin. See Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge?
The Origins of Cultural Property Protection in England, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1560 (1990).
151. Id. at 1545-46.
152. Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire and the
Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1142, 1151 (1990) (quoting Lord Francis Hervey, a
lawyer).
153. Id. at 1545.
154. Id. at 1547-49. Discussing the Lubbock Bill, the author noted that:
[The] bill marked a radical turn in the development of property law. His was the
first piece of legislation in the Anglo-American world to embrace two related
principles: that the protection of cultural property was a governmental duty, and
that public ownership and control should be brought to bear on unwilling
proprietors.
Id. at 1549.
155. Id. at 1562-63.
156. Id at 1561 (quoting JOHN RUsKrN, THE SEvEN LAMPS OF ARCHITECTURE 201 (1956)).
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Despite the persistence of private ownership, Ruskin argued that the public has
a duty to care properly for and preserve these works of genius, a duty passed on
to us by the creators themselves. 5 7 It was this notion of duty, rather than
ownership rights, which dominated Ruskin's thoughts on cultural heritage. These
two concepts, public ownership and duty, form the foundation respectively of the
last explanation in this Part and the final Part of this Article which examines a
non-ownership based justification for tribal control and possession of cultural
patrimony. The latter argument is relatively uncharted territory and as a
consequence provides rather uncertain conclusions about repatriation. The
former, however, has been more thoroughly discussed and provides convincing
justifications for tribal ownership and repatriation. It is to this explanation that
I now turn.
Public property, in the sense of being owned by the "unorganized public"'5 8 is
not a foreign concept to the common law although its present day application is
relatively limited. Traditionally, the public has maintained property rights in
roads, highways, streets, tidal and submerged lands, and navigable waterways.'59
Most recently, a public right to beach front property has been recognized. 60 As
with cultural patrimony, it is not completely clear why such property rights are
vested in the public at large. There are, as Carol Rose discusses in her work on
public property, efficiency reasons for public ownership: inherently public
property is necessarily susceptible to holdouts and monopolization. We have
already explored some of the possible efficiency justifications for tribal
ownership of cultural patrimony and although efficiency is a necessary feature
in Rose's analysis, it is by no means a sufficient reason to subvert individual
ownership. The property in question additionally must be more valuable when
used by "indefinite and unlimited numbers." Thus, as Carol Rose discovers, some
inherently public property served to protect and encourage commercial
activity-an activity which benefitted from increased numbers. But, as Rose
points out, commerce was thought to be an educational and socializing activity
and it was this more fundamental purpose that was served by inherently public
property.' 6' It was the socializing feature of commons and recreation grounds
which made their value to the public far superior to the value such property could
157. Sax, supra note 152 at 1562 ("[T]he work did not and should not, if we respected its
makers and their sense of commitment, belong to us. It was not the buildings, but their builders,
who had a claim upon us.").
158. Rose, supra note 125, at 711, 721, 730-31 (1986) (discussing the distinction between
the government as the public and the "unorganized public" owning property).
159. Id. at 723-30 (discussing law pertaining to roadways and waterways). Some of these
same public rights in property were recognized in Roman law. Justinian states:
[A]ll rivers and harbours are public, so that all persons have a right to fish
therein.... Again, the public use of the banks of a river, as of the river itself,
is part of the law of nations; consequently every one is entitled to bring his or
her vessel to the bank ... as freely as he may navigate the river itself...
Again, the public use of the sea-shore, as of the sea itself, is part of the law of
nations ....
J. INST. 2.1.
160. Rose, supra note 125, at 713.
161. Id. at 774-82.
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have had to any given individual. Perhaps historic sites most clearly convey the
notion of increased value from shared recognition and participation. Rose states:
"[A]s United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway eloquently reminded us a
hundred years ago, the commemoration of a great battle would not have been so
valuable had it not been shared by all at common expense-nor would it have
been so poignant anywhere other than the battlefield itself."'62
The concept of "inherently public property" as explicated in Rose's work
applies only to immovables-land, water, and historic sites. In fact, it is the fixed
location which both concentrates and enhances the attention of a particular
community. The use, gathering, and socializing functions so integral to
"inherently public property" are contingent on the fixity of location. Because a
particular piece of property has certain features and is in a particular place, it
serves an essential and valuable communal function. Thus at first, it appears
unlikely that moveables, mere objects, could satisfy the requirements of
"inherently public property." And yet it is precisely cultural patrimony's
educational and communal value which makes it so desirable and valuable to
museums.' Objects of cultural patrimony "nourish a sense of community"'" and
cultural awareness and serve as a "source of knowledge and wisdom,"' 65 thus
enhancing the general welfare of the community-the community being all those
who have access to the objects.
In this sense cultural patrimony appears to satisfy the most important
requirement of inherently public property-its value increases when the public,
an indefinite and unlimited number of people, have access to it. The problem
with this conclusion, however, is that there is no limit on public ownership.
There is no way to determine which public, group, or community maintains the
right of ownership. The argument set out above permits ownership by all the
people of the United States, perhaps even the entire world community, certainly
not just a particular Native American tribe. Native American cultural objects
should, according to this argument, remain in the possession of museums, rather
than be returned to their culturally affiliated tribe. In fact similar arguments have
been made by those who quite strongly oppose the retention of cultural patrimony
by nations of origin. The international movement of cultural property, according
to these opponents of retentive laws, promotes understanding between cultures
and nations and serves a broad educational and scientific purpose which benefits
all of mankind." Thus cultural patrimony does present a unique problem. With
respect to immovables, "public" connotes that community which is in close
proximity and capable of immediate and steady access to the fixed resource. But
162. Id. at 777 (discussing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), in
which the United States sought to create a national battlefield memorial at Gettysburg).
163. Report of the Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American Relations,
supra note 85, at 495-96 (recognizing the knowledge to be gained from and the educational
value of cultural objects)..
164. John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REv. 339,
349 (1989).
165. Id. at 353.
166. Id. at 345-49,353-55; see also Merryman, supra note 164, at 1895 (explaining why "we
care" about cultural property).
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
with respect to moveable items of cultural property, this could be any group or
community.
2. The Tribe and Property
There are two considerations that help narrow public ownership to culturally
affiliated tribes. The first answer is built into Rose's concept of "inherently
public property." The "public" in Rose's analysis is not just any random group
of individuals. As she states, the public at large must be "capable of acting
through the medium of custom and habits. :. .,67 If the unorganized public in
question is not capable of "self-management," it loses its claim as it is unlikely
to use and care for efficiently the resource in question. The larger the community
and the more distant the individuals are from both knowledge and understanding
of the objects in question, the less likelihood there is that they will be suitable
members of the "public" in the relevant sense. In fact cultural objects which are
available to the public and which are no longer situated in their indigenous
communities are not owned by the public at large but rather by the government
acting through museums and institutions whose concern it is to educate the
public. This does not alter the public nature of the property; it simply restricts
ownership rights to the organized, rather than the unorganized public. The
ownership of such objects by the unorganized American public is in fact a
nonsensical suggestion. The unorganized American public has neither the
knowledge, the background, nor the incentive to care for Native American
cultural patrimony.
Culturally affiliated Native American tribes as an unorganized public group do,
however, satisfy the requirements of "public" with respect to the ownership of
their cultural patrimony. Their knowledge of and historical connection to Native
American cultural objects make them uniquely qualified property managers. In
fact it may be that a cultural connection is the only bond strong enough to
engender the "custom and habit" necessary for ownership by an unorganized
public. Within the tribal community itself, public ownership is still justifiable for
all the reasons discussed above: the value of cultural patrimony is enhanced by
communal access and, as a scarce resource, it is susceptible to holdouts and
ethnic externalities under a scheme of individual ownership. The fact that
culturally affiliated tribes are more capable of managing cultural patrimony than
an unorganized American public does not negate the American public's
ownership interest through museums and other government institutions. But if
Native Americans can manage their cultural patrimony better than the
unorganized United States, perhaps this suggests that Native American
governmental institutions would also be better caretakers of cultural patrimony
than the governmental organizations of the United States. In essence, customary
capacity may indicate which public is likely to be a better owner whether acting
through official government institutions or as an unorganized community.
The second means by which we can narrow ownership to a culturally affiliated
tribe is found in Rose's exploration of customary rights. Customary rights differ
167. Rose, supra note 125, at 774.
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from other public rights in property in that they are "enjoyed not by individuals
as such but only as members of a specific locality."' 68 Thus customary rights,
unlike the general theory of ownership by an unorganized public, limit public
participation to a specific, identifiable group; a community capable of
maintaining customary rights is not the public at large but rather a smaller,
limited group. The most notable customary rights are recreational
uses---"maypole dances, horse races, cricket matches, and the like."' 69 By the end
of the nineteenth century, customary rights were legally out of fashion in the
United States, 7 but they continue to be particularly helpful in understanding
tribal claims. First, the two theories of the origins of customary rights, the notion
of immemorial usage and the existence of a local law predating the introduction
of the common law, are nonsensical in the context of Anglo-American society:
European settlement is relatively recent and the British introduced the common
law to America upon their arrival.' But this is not the case for Native
Americans. The requirements of immemorial usage and/or a local law predating
the advent of the common law are quite easily satisfied by Native American
tribes. In fact some tribal claims, including fishing and hunting, are said to be
founded on "immemorial custom and practice."' 72 Second, in cases rejecting
customary rights some concern was expressed that the grantee was too
"fluctuating" in character to support such a claim,'" but again this is not a
problem with Native American ownership. The ethnic, familial, and territorial
limits of Native American tribes circumvent the perceived problem of the
indefinite nature of the grantee of customary rights.
But customary rights were recognized for reasons beyond the often fictitious
belief in immemorial usage and ancient law. The most essential feature of a
customary right was the value of the use itself. The recreational and social
purposes preserved through customary rights were uniquely valuable to a
particular community. The value of such uses could not be enhanced by opening
them up to the world at large unlike something like commerce which flourished
under the prospect of an infinite number of participants. 74 The same can be said
of cultural patrimony.
168. Id. at 740.
169. Id at 741 (cases cited therein).
170. See, e.g., Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98, 99 (1905), discussed in Rose, supra note 125,
at 741 ("[S]uch rules of the English common law.., were unadapted to the conditions of
political society existing here, and have never been in force in Connecticut.").
171. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L. 125, 130 (1825) (noting that immemorial usage
is impossible in the United States whose history does not extend back to the reign of Richard
I), cited in Rose, supra note 125, at 741 n. 145; Delaphane v. Crenshaw & Fisher, 56 Va. (15
Gratt.) 457, 470-71 (1860) (noting that the notion of a law predating the common law is
impossible in the United States), cited in Rose, supra note 125, at 741 n. 145.
172. COHEN, supra note 6, at 442.
173. See Graham, 61 A. at 99, discussed in Rose, supra note 125, at 741. Rose suggests that
this may in any event have been a misguided objection. She points out that the public-at-large
which maintained the right of "implied dedication" had a less definite, more "fluctuating"
character. Rose, supra note 125, at 741-42.
174. Rose, supra note 125, at 769 ("Recreation and festivals have meaning and special social
value for a given community, not for the world at large.").
1997]
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
The discussion so far has assumed that as a form of inherently public property,
cultural patrimony has a shared universal value but this is not necessarily true.
The value of Native American cultural patrimony to its culturally affiliated tribe
is different both in kind and in intensity. Although non-Native Americans may
appreciate both the aesthetic and educational value of a wampum belt, the same
object evokes in Native Americans an emotional solidarity with the past and a
dedication to preserve tribal life and society. The world at large may benefit from
access to Native American cultural patrimony but this value will pale in
comparison to the exclusive socializing effect such property has on its culturally
affiliated tribe. Although these interests are not mutually exclusive, Native
American ownership must be at least marginally exclusive if the property is to
serve as an effective bonding agent for the tribal community. The unique value
of cultural patrimony may also stem from the act of creation. The production and
enjoyment of cultural property are connected in such a way that those who
participated in both creating it and imbuing it with communal significance, an
ongoing process, may be the only people truly capable of appreciating it in the
fullest sense possible.'
This argument takes on greater significance when one considers the possibility
of diametrically opposed uses of cultural patrimony. A culturally affiliated tribe
may believe that the most appropriate way to care for an item of cultural heritage
is to destroy, hide, or bury it' while the museum community will want to
preserve and display it. Only an argument which accounts for the existence of
diverse and incommensurable values will enable a culturally affiliated tribe to
deal with its cultural patrimony in a destructive manner.'
In certain circumstances, this balance of interests may change. One can
imagine a situation in which a non-culturally affiliated group which has
possessed an object of cultural patrimony for a lengthy period of time (perhaps
centuries) becomes so attached to it that it assumes a significance not unlike the
significance it had for its original possessors. For example, the British
occasionally argue that the Parthenon Marbles have been in the British Museum
for such a long time that they see them as part of their cultural heritage, a vital
feature of Britain's role as the instigator of classical archaeology. ' Although we
should not rule out the possibility of such a development, it would require the
occurrence of a major, non-exploitative event involving the objects and the
passage of a significant amount of time. Even under these circumstances such
claims should be scrutinized very closely.
175. Cultural patrimony is, in this sense, similar to what Denise Reaume has termed
"participatory goods." Reaume, supra note 7, at 9-10.
176. See, e.g., Nichols et al., supra note 30, at 33 (discussing the Zuni War Gods).
177. Those who argue against both repatriation and retention laws designed to prohibit the
export of cultural property often do so on the basis of preservation and protection, ignoring the
possibility that apparently neglectful indigenous treatment of cultural objects may be culturally
required and serve an important cultural purpose. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 126, at 502-
08.
178. See Merryman, supra note 46, at 1915-16. This argument seems somewhat suspect with
respect to the Parthenon Marbles, unless one stretches cultural attributes to include imperialism
or an aspiring cosmopolitanism.
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Thus, on the one hand, an unlimited number of people could take advantage of
the unique benefits of cultural patrimony if it were to remain in the possession
of public museums. Cultural patrimony would not, under such circumstances, be
inherently public property owned by the public at large, except in rare local
cases, but it would continue to be a form of public property whose value
increases when made available to unlimited numbers. If, on the other hand,
Native American tribes are recognized as the rightful owners, a limited number
of individuals, that is members of a culturally affiliated tribe, could do with the
property as they see fit and as is appropriate to the original nature of the object,
with the potential consequence of obliterating the interest of the public at large
outside of the tribe. This is justified by the enhanced value of such property
when possessed and utilized by a culturally affiliated tribe. The doctrine of
customary rights provides a justification for allocating property rights to
culturally affiliated tribes even at the expense of the interests of the American
public.
V. PROPERTY AND CULTURAL INTEGRITY
Although Rose's exploration of inherently public property, in particular the
doctrine of customary rights, provides a convincing justification for NAGPRA's
allocation of property rights in cultural property, one more explanation warrants
examination. As with the previous explanation, this approach also focuses on the
problem of diverse, if not competing, ways of valuing cultural property. But
unlike the previous discussion, this final explanation will step outside the
confines of property law and property rights.
Property rights as an idea or a legitimating institution can be used to explain
almost any relationship we as individuals or as groups have with the external
world. Given the arguably all encompassing nature of property rights, how is it
possible that I intend to speak outside of this concept? Perhaps the more
important question is, why would I choose to do so? If we assume property rights
to be the familiar notion of a bundle which includes an abundance of rights, most
prominently, the rights to possess, use, capitalize on, and exclude others,' 79
evidence of entitlement to just one of these incidents of ownership is sufficient
to claim a property right. Property rights in most objects are often scattered
amongst a number of people or entities; if you hold just one of the sticks in the
bundle, you are assumed to have some property rights in the object in question.
Despite this fragmenting of property rights, the concept of ownership in a single
person or entity persists and pervades our understanding of the concept of
property. We continue to think of real and personal property as belonging to
someone. When my friend proudly declares she is a new homeowner, there is a
sense in which her house belongs to her despite the fact the bank actually has a
large stake in her property. When I declare I own my car, and in fact I have paid
off my car loan so I can even hold the title in hand, there is again an
179. For a discussion of the incidents of ownership, see TONY HoNoRE, Ownership, in
MAKING LAW BIND (1987).
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overwhelming sense that this car belongs to me despite the fact my property
rights are seriously curtailed by legal restrictions on how I use my car. 8 '
This sense of belonging or ownership, which often glosses over the
fragmentation of property rights, is not just an intuitive observation of our
understanding of property. It is also what economic efficiency and other property
theorists bank on in preferring private over group ownership. Give someone a
personal stake in their home, a tract of land, a resource, or even something as
small as a book, so the economic efficiency story goes, and they are more likely
to care properly for, manage, and preserve it for the future. Therefore, this sense
of belonging is important to property. It is, in fact, "the organizing idea" behind
private property.' Ownership and belonging are the hallmarks of property
despite the fact that rarely are all the sticks in the bundle concentrated in one set
of hands.
It is this notion of belonging that I wish to avoid in the context of cultural
property. In this final Part, I will argue that cultural property does not really
belong to .anyone, that it is not a means to some exclusive human end. Rather, I
will argue that all of us have a duty towards cultural property because of its
relative scarcity and its profound significance. Cultural property takes on a life
and meaning of its own; it acquires something like a soul and it is this soul, not
a specific human end, which shapes our relationship with cultural property. This
might sound rather odd to some readers. How is it, or why is it, I speak of having
duties toward objects? What does this duty entail and who will enforce it in the
absence of a right holder?
I want to begin with looking at whether this idea of sanctifying objects is
actually as odd as it first appears. The ensoulment of objects is familiar to many
Native American tribes.12 But even in our own Western culture, arguably marked
by a constant leaning toward skepticism, there is an inkling of the ensoulment of
certain inanimate objects. For example, we do border on believing in the
180. The legal restrictions on how I use my car, when, where, and how I drive it, is evidence
of a public entitlement or interest in my car. In fact, I may even lose my car completely if I
violate certain restrictions. For example, my car may be taken away if used in the commission
of a crime.
181. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHTTO PRIVATE PROPERTY 38 (1988) ("The organizing idea
of a private property system is that, in principle, each resource belongs to some individual.").
182. A fine example of the ensoulment or animation of objects is the following story
remembered by Jonathan Haas of the Center for Cultural Understanding and Change at the
Field Museum of Natural History:
Haas recalls a visit to the museum a few years ago by some Hopi elders who
were concerned about the kachinas on display and in storage. They said that the
kachinas stored in plastic bags couldn't breathe and that all of the kachinas
needed to be fed sacred cornmeal. With the museum's help, the elders placed all
of the kachinas on the ground, faced them west, and conducted a feeding
ceremony.
Charles Storch, Museums Create a Flurry ofMixed Emotions as They Race to Divulge Native
American Artifacts, CHt. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1993, at Tempo 1.
[Vol. 72:723
NATIVE AMERICAN PROPERTY
animation of certain public memorials.' One need only watch people filing past
the Vietnam Memorial to get a sense of this phenomenon. The Vietnam Memorial
resonates for almost all of us, but particularly for those with a close association
to the Vietnam War. It reaches out beyond its stone boundaries to recall a time,
a place, and an experience in American history and it is that experience which
becomes the soul, the essence of the Memorial. Although ensoulment may for
some seem a little strong, I think we can all agree that the Vietnam Memorial was
designed to speak to us and evoke the memories of the Vietnam War and it
succeeds in this purpose. There is something alive about the Memorial,
something which requires our profound respect and which elevates it above any
specific human end. The Vietnam Memorial has a life of its own, an intrinsically
meaningful existence.
Another example of the ensoulment of inanimate objects, or in this case
perhaps a refusal to accept the departure of a soul when evidence of life is gone,
can be found in our treatment of human remains. Human remains are considered
"quasi-property" in the common law but in the following sub-Part, I argue that
our relationship with these objects is conceptually distinct from the organizing
idea of private property rights-the idea that an object belongs to someone.
Human remains also feature prominently in NAGPRA and thus some of the
following discussion will focus on the Native American predicament concerning
the treatment of the remains of their ancestors. Understanding our treatment of
human remains should provide us with some insight into the approach I am
advocating for cultural property.
A. Human Remains
The common law has always demonstrated a special solicitude toward human
remains and cemeteries. Traditionally, human remains fall outside of the common
law concept of personal property: they cannot be owned, bought, or sold.'84
Certain individuals, usually a surviving spouse or the next of kin, maintain a
quasi-property right in a dead body which entitles them to give it a proper burial
183. Hegel seemed to believe in the ensoulment of public memorials. He states, "public
memorials are not property, or more precisely, it is their indwelling soul of remembrance and
honor which gives them their validity as living and self-sufficient ends." GEORG WILHELM
FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 64 (T.M. Knox trans., 1964).
184. The English common law rule held that "[t]he burial of the Cadaver is nullius in bonis
and belongs to Ecclesiastical cognizance." 3 Co. INST. 203; see also Leno v. St. Joseph's
Hosp., 302 N.E.2d 58, 59 (Il1. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding there is no property right in the ordinary
sense in a dead body); Lubin v. Sydenham Hosp., 42 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943).
A deceased body does not form part of the deceased's estate. See Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170,
171 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1900); Smart v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1978). Also, it
is not considered ordinary commercial chattel. See Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (Minn.
Sup. Ct. 1891) (holding that there is no property right in a dead body in the ordinary
commercial sense); Finley v. Atlantic Transp. Co., 115 N.E. 715, 717 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1917).
See also Roger G. Magnusson, Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue, in INTERSTS IN GOODS
237, 239, 242-44 (Norman Palmer & Ewan McKendrick eds., 1993) (discussing first the
English then the American positions on proprietary right in human corpses); Note, The Sale
of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182, 1241-44 (1974).
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and to ensure that no one disturbs its rest. 5 The right to bury a relative includes
choosing the place and rites of burial, and, if appropriate reinterring the remains.
Any tortious interference with the right, such as an unlawful autopsy, improper
burial, or unauthorized reinternment gives rise to an action for damages including
damages for mental distress. The surviving spouse or next of kin also retains a
limited property right in the spot where the individual is buried. 6 Beyond this,
human remains belong to the earth.
Cemeteries also have protected status under the common law. In the early days
of the common law, protected cemeteries were only those burial grounds found
within the church yard. However, the definition of a cemetery was broadened in
the United States to include any formal, marked burial ground. 7 Disturbing a
cemetery is now a crime in all fifty states.'88 If a burial site has been abandoned
or if it does not satisfy the definition of a cemetery, the remains vest in the owner
of the land upon which they are found. Otherwise, even a subsequent purchaser
of land which includes a burial site is not permitted to disturb the plot.'89
Under the law set out above Native Americans could seek the return of the
remains of their ancestors through their quasi-property right to give them a
proper burial and to protect the burial site. 9 ' And prevention of further
plundering of Native American graves could be ensured by enforcing state laws
against disturbing cemeteries. But Native Americans have until recently' been
excluded from this special legal regime governing the dead. To begin with, the
age of many remains has made it very difficult to prove a sufficient ancestral
. 185. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Welch, 82 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1936); Pettigrew v.
Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1904); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery,
10 R.I. 227, 237-38, 242-43 (1872); see also Note, supra note 184, at 1245-46.
186. See Rivers v. Greenwood Cemetery, 22 S.E.2d 134, 135 (Ga. 1942).
187. PRICE, supra note 14, at 23.
188. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE §§ 8100, 8101 (West 1970 & Supp. 1997).
189. See Anderson v. Acheson, 110 N.W. 335, 340 (Iowa 1907) (stating that a subsequent
owner of land is not permitted to disturb a burial plot found on the land).
190. See Rivers, 22 S.E.2d at 135 (asserting that a surviving spouse or next of kin retains an
ongoing right to have the body properly buried).
191. In addition to the recent changes brought about through NAGPRA and other federal
laws, including the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-
470mm (1994) and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996, most states
have extended legislative protection of cemeteries to unmarked burial sites. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 41.35.020 (Michie 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-80-401 (1988). Such legislation has
been passed in Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Montana, South
Dakota, and West Virginia have passed such legislation in the past five years. See PRICE, supra
note 14, at 122-25; David J. Harris, Respect for the Living and Respect for the Dead: Return
ofIndian and Other Native American Burial Remains, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L.
195 (1991) (summarizing state laws on unmarked-burial protection); Yalung & Wala, supra
note 14.
Some states have also passed their own repatriation legislation dealing primarily with human
remains. See, e.g., Unmarked Human Burial Sites and Skeletal Remains Protection Act, NEB.
REv. STAT. § 12-1201 (1990); Yalung & Wala, supra note 14.
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connection. In many cases Indian remains are not included in this special legal
regime simply due to their age. 92 The courts, the federal government, and
museums have in the past displayed a blatant disregard for Native American
remains and burial customs. 93 The sheer number of estimated Native American
remains in federal institutions is incontrovertible evidence of this problem. It is
estimated that there are over 300,000 Native American skeletal remains in the
possession of federal institutions. This comprises approximately ninety-nine
percent of all human remains in federal institutions.' 94 Most of the remains were
collected and are being held under the broad justification of scientific value.'95
Even if we accept scientific investigation as a legitimate interest and one worth
subverting the claims of living Native Americans, it is insupportable, indeed
disingenuous, given the number of remains in federal institutions which have
been sitting in boxes for decades.'96
Native Americans face a different problem with respect to preserving their
burial grounds: the definition of "cemetery" under the common law and under
most state statutes has until quite recently been limited to Judaeo-Christian burial
practices. A "cemetery" is typically defined as several burials with visible grave
192. The case law dealing with dead bodies generally concerns recently dead bodies; skeletal
remains are often excluded from the definition of a dead body. See Carter v. City of Zanesville,
52 N.E. 126, 127 (Ohio 1898) (stating that older human skeletal remains are not considered
dead bodies under Ohio legislation); State v. Glass, 273 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ohio Ct. App.
1971); see also Margaret Bowman, The Reburial of Native American Skeletal Remains:
Approaches to the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARv. ENVn.. L. REV. 147, 169 (1989).
Tribes will occasionally refuse an offer of repatriation because of the age of the remains
and/or because the desecration committed in the removal is irreversible and return thus serves
no purpose. See Livesay, supra note 81, at 297-98 (The Zuni rejected an offer from the New
Mexico State Museum for the return of Zuni remains as they were "permanently desecrated,"
and the Nambe rejected a similar offer because the remains were over 800 years old.).
193. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 174 So. 2d 479, 481-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(acquitting a student who removed a skull from a burial in the Everglades of wantonly and
maliciously disturbing the contents of a tomb on the basis that there was no malice and that the
Seminole burial customs were "unfamiliar" as compared to Christian burials).
For a "shameful account" of the collecting, stealing, and exhuming of Native American
human remains, see BIEDER, supra note 12, at 278-363.
194. See Bowman, supra note 192, at 149; Quade, supra note 35, at 28 (stating that
estimates range from 100,000 to 2.5 million).
Information from the Office of Repatriation at the Smithsonian does not provide a final tally.
It does state, however, that approximately 17,600 "skeletal lots" in the Physical Anthropology
collection will be inventoried under direction from the National American Indian Museum Act,
20 U.S.C. § 80q (1994). The most immediate concern for the Smithsonian is dealing with four
thousand skeletal remains transferred from the Army Medical Museum, which include remains
collected by military officials from "battlefields, army posts and other locations." Killion et al.,
supra note 10, at 2.
195. Bowman, supra note 192, at 150-53 (discussing the conflict between the scientific
community and Native Americans with respect to the disposition of remains).
196. Iae at 152 ("I think it is arrogance in the extreme to say that those sites have scientific
value and should be exploited for their scientific value when the legacy is 300,000 human
remains in cardboard boxes.").
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markers. 97 Unless a burial ground is clearly marked as such, it is often denied
protection under the various laws dealing with cemeteries. Furthermore, if a
"cemetery" is abandoned, it is no longer protected by the law. Many Native
American burial sites are considered abandoned even though the "abandonment"
was involuntary.' Most burial sites were deserted when tribes were forced from
their land. In the case of Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc.,199
Community Construction disinterred the remains of over 200 Indians in the
course of an excavation. The site was indisputably identified as a significant
burial ground by both archaeologists and descendants of the Miwok. But the
plaintiff, a direct descendant of the Miwok, was denied an injunction to stop the
excavation on the basis that the site did not constitute a "cemetery" as
contemplated by the California statute under which the action was brought. In a
rhetorical flourish at the outset of the opinion, Associate Justice Blease quite
remarkably captured both the passion of the descendants and the harsh
insensitivity of the law:
This case comes to us shrouded in the history of an ancient Indian people
whose remains, bulldozed from their resting place, stir the anguish of their
descendants. But there is no succor for these profound sensitivities in the law
to which plaintiff appeals, the sepulchral confines of the California cemetery
law.
200
Other courts have been more sympathetic to Native American requests for
protection of their ancestral burial grounds.2 ' But in general success has only
been achieved through the dedication of concerned state lawmakers. 0 2
The discussion so far has focused on the exclusion of Native American burial
sites and human remains from the protections of statutory and common law
without considering the specific views of Native Americans regarding the dead.
It is impossible to speak of a unified Native American view on human remains.
197. See, for example, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8100 (West 1970 & Supp. 1997);
supra note 191 for a list of the states which have recently extended grave protection legislation
to include unmarked burial sites.
198. But see Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App.); see discussion in text infra at
note 201.
199. 180 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1982).
200. Id. at 424. In response to this decision, California amended its laws pertaining to
cemeteries so that they now explicitly include unmarked Native American burial grounds. CAL.
Gov'T. CODE § 6254(r) (West 1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7050.5 (West Supp.
1988); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5097.94, .98, .99 (West 1984 & Supp.).
201. See, e.g., Charrier, 496 So.2d at 601 (noting that burial ground discovered on private
land was not considered abandoned and descendants were given the "right to enjoin the
disintemment of their deceased relatives, as well as receive damages for the desecration
involved").
Native Americans have also unsuccessfully sought protection of their burial grounds through
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (rejecting free exercise argument against building a road and
logging on a historically significant religious site on the basis that although the plan would
seriously interfere with Indian religious practices, they were not "coerced by the Government's
actions into violating their religious beliefs").
202. See supra note 191 for a-list of the states which have recently extended grave protection
legislation to include unmarked burial sites.
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Some tribes believe that the human spirit is connected with the remains until they
are completely decomposed. 2 3 Walter Echo-Hawk, an advocate for repatriation,
states that "[m]ost of the tribes believe that if you rob the dead.., it disturbs the
spirit and visits harm upon not only those who disturbed the grave, but on the
relatives of the dead who allowed that to happen."2' For example, the Kumeyaay
believe that if the remains of an ancestor are disturbed, the spirit returns from the
afterworld and remains in pain until the remains are again returned to the earth. 5
But there are other tribes who have no interest in the remains of their ancestors.
The Mesquakie tribe believes that four days after death the spirit leaves the
remains and never returns.
2 6
The sensitivity of some Native American tribes to the disposition of their
ancestral remains is a particularly compelling reason to mandate legislatively
their return. But Native Americans have generally sought the return of remains
not on the basis of their unique cultural and religious beliefs but rather on the
basis that they deserve the same treatment and respect accorded to others.0 7
Walter Echo-Hawk states: "The Indian belief is not out of the ordinary and we're
just trying to secure protection for what everyone else already believes."2 ' The
NAGPRA provisions relating to human remains do precisely what Echo-Hawk
has argued for: they grant Native Americans the same legal rights as other
Americans have concerning their ancestral remains. Such commensurate
treatment is pivotal to cultural integrity and pride and thus the preservation of
cultural identity, regardless of particular Native American beliefs about the
spiritual afterlife of their ancestors. The treatment of human remains in
NAGPRA is thus neither a recognition of a unique Native American attitude
toward human remains, nor is it a departure from the law itself.2' The NAGPRA
provisions merely rectify a gap in common law protection and in doing so permit
Native Americans the same level of spiritual ease other Americans enjoy when
they ponder the fate of their ancestors.
203. See PRICE, supra note 14, at 15.
204. Quade, supra note 35, at 29.
205. Bowman, supra note 192, at 149.
206. Id. at 149.
207. Id. at 150.
[W]hen excavating an area in Tennessee to be flooded by the Tellico Dam,
remains of white settlers, black slaves, and Native Americans were uncovered.
The white remains and, after brief study, the black remains were reburied, both
with suitable religious services. Only the Native American remains were retained
for extensive study and have still not been returned to the earth.
Id.
208. Quade, supra note 35, at 29.
209. However, the fact that culturally affiliated individuals other than proven lineal
descendants can request human remains for reburial may be a departure from the common law
approach which only grants to descendants the quasi-property right entitling them to bury the
remains of their relatives. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (1994); see, e.g., Bailey v. Miller, 143 N.Y.S.2d
122, 123-24 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (holding that an Indian who was not a direct descendant of anyone
buried in a burial ground to be excavated was denied standing to prevent the disinternment of
human remains).
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The legal treatment of human remains, as reflected in NAGPRA, is somewhat
of an anomaly in property law. There are, however, similar restrictions on the
property rights we have in our own bodies.21° In particular the buying and selling
of essential body parts is prohibited,2 ' The justification for restrictions on the
alienation of body parts might be nothing more than paternalism. Arguably, the
government believes that individuals should not, and given ideal circumstances
would not, have essential parts of their bodies removed simply for financial
reasons.2"2 But under this paternalistic directive may lie a much more significant
reason for the restrictions. In the hearings leading up to the passage of federal
legislation prohibiting the sale of essential body parts, then Senator Al Gore
stated:
It is against our system of values to buy and sell parts of human beings. It is
against our system of values to auction off life to the highest bidder.... The
notion has perhaps superficial attraction to some because we have learned
that the market system will solve lots of problems if we just stand out of the
way and let it work. It is very true. This ought to be an exception. It ought to
be the exception because you don't want to invest property rights in human
beings.... It is just wrong.213
Why is it "just wrong"? Why is it that we tend to avoid property rights in
human beings, either dead or alive? One plausible answer, implicit in Senator
Gore's statement and in the law pertaining to human remains, is a belief in the
importance and preservation of human dignity. It is true that the exceptionally
narrow range of "rights" that one has in human remains differs from culture to
culture and religion to religion. But basic respect for human remains appears to
rise above cultural and religious barriers. Safeguarding human dignity is a
universal justification for this peculiar, spiritual attitude we all share toward the
remains of our ancestors. This helps us understand why the supposed quasi-
property right in human remains is more aptly described as a duty-a duty to
preserve the dignity of the deceased individual and human beings in general.
Some might argue that the duty to bury human remains stems from a concern for
public health rather than human dignity. But this does not explain why we tend
to believe as the common law affirms, that even indigents deserve a proper burial
210. Although the restrictions on the ownership of human remains and body parts are
similar, they are by no means identical. Human remains are strictly inalienable, or in Susan
Rose-Ackerman's taxonomy, purely inalienable: sales and gifts of human remains are
forbidden. Whereas some body parts are only subject to a "modified" inalienability restriction.
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 108, at 935, 948-49.
211. See The National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994). The Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act of 1987 § 10 also prohibits the "purchase or sale" for "valuable
consideration" of human organs if the removal is "intended to occur after the death of the
decedent." UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 58 (1993).
212. Another possible reason is the prevention of murder for the sale of body parts.
213. House Hearing on H.R 4080, "National Organ Transplant Act": Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 128 (1984).
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rather than indiscreet removal.2 4 The existence of a right in this case appears to
be wholly dependent on a preexisting duty to care properly for human remains.
As stated by a Pennsylvania court: "When a man dies, public policy and regard
for the public health, as well as the universal sense ofpropriety, require that his
body should be decently cared for and disposed of. The duty of disposition
therefore devolves upon someone and must carry with it the right to perform. 21 5
A logical extension of this argument is that there is no right to bury those who
do not deserve a respectful burial-an unlikely but plausible situation.2'6
Thus it appears that human remains are objects for which the limited right of
custody is contingent on and circumscribed by a preexisting duty; a duty to
preserve the dignity of human life; a duty to respect the memory of the dead. It
is this duty which dictates a code of acceptable moral and legal conduct. Whether
we speak of this duty as a duty to the preservation of human dignity or to the
memory of a specific person or to the remains themselves because of what they
symbolize, it is a duty which we accept as both necessary and appropriate. It is
also a duty which persists regardless of whether there is anyone capable of
accepting the "right." When there are no next of kin or other obvious persons to
assume the responsibility of burial, the common law will appoint someone to
properly care for the remains.2"7 To be certain, carrying out such a duty is a
burden and a responsibility but one which, as with many responsibilities, is also
regarded as a privilege and an honor. Our willingness to assume this
responsibility is a sign of our humanity. The responsibility we share to treat the
remains of our deceased relatives with respect is essentially a duty for which
there is no preestablished concomitant right and thus to speak of our brief
possession of human remains as a "quasi-property right" is somewhat misleading.
There are no conventional property rights in human remains. Human remains do
not belong to anyone.
214. See, e.g., Finley v. Atlantic Transp. Co., 115 N.E. 715, 717 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1917)
(holding that a body cannot be cast out so as to expose it to violation or offend the feelings or
safety of the public).
215. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1904) (emphasis added); see also
Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 238 (1872) ("There is a duty,
imposed by the universal feelings of mankind, to be discharged by some one towards the dead,
a duty, and we may also say a right, to protect from violation, and a duty on the part of others
to abstain from violation.").
216. In the story of Antigone, for example, Polynices, one of Antigone's brothers,
participates in a revolt against Thebes and is killed. As punishment for his actions, his remains
were to be left unburied but Antigone defies the order, buries her brother, and is consequently,
condemned to death.
217. See, e.g., 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 19 ("It would seem, at common law, that if
a poor person of no estate dies and there is no other person bound to perform the burial
function, it is the duty of him under whose roof the body lies to carry it, decently covered, to




Our attitude towards human remains provides a precedent for establishing a
separate category of goods that we view as ends in themselves. These goods take
on a purpose and a life which transcends the vagaries of specific human ends. It
is erroneous to say that these goods or resources really belong to someone in the
same sense that my car or my house belongs to me. Given the nature of these
goods and the enduring human values they objectify, it is my belief that they are
ill-suited to the existing private personal property regime.2 8 We might say that
such goods interest "the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many
matters of actual property,""1 9 and are thus too precious to be left to the whim and
fancy of individual right-holders. Surely this is what has driven the unique legal
approach to human remains and what should drive our approach to the possession
and control of cultural property. But articulating the existence of a duty to
cultural property, not unlike a duty to human remains, still leaves unanswered
important questions regarding the source of this duty, possession and appropriate
treatment of cultural property. What important value gives rise to this duty? Who
is to have possession of these cultural objects and how will we know what
treatment is appropriate?
Not unlike human remains, cultural property is inextricably tied to our
reverence for human experience and the past; we treasure cultural property
because it represents human achievement and cultural advancement?2 " It is the
embodiment of all that is wonderful, mysterious, sacred, and enduring about a
culture. It captures both the achievements and the follies of specific cultural
groups and as such forms living reminders of past and present cultural
experience. Such experience, as with human experience, is deserving of our
respect for it provides the context of human life. Cultural property is an
objectification of cultural experience and thus our treatment of cultural property
should be governed by our obligation to respect and preserve the integrity of a
culture. Just as the proper burial of human remains preserves human dignity, the
proper care and use of cultural property preserves cultural integrity or the
cultural memory and experience associated with these objects.
One obvious stumbling block at this point in the analysis is that if we are
sincerely interested in treating cultural property in a way which best preserves
cultural integrity, whose culture is relevant? Some might argue that given the
length of time these objects have been apart from the tribe or culture with which
they were originally affiliated, they are as much if not more a part of our
American culture interpreted as either a multi-cultural melting pot, or a museum
218. We might also compare cultural property to other scarce and precious resources, such
as endangered species, to which we owe a duty of preservation. See Phyllis Mauch Messenger,
Introduction, in THE ETHics OF COLLECTING, supra note 30, at 1, 19-20 (comparing cultural
property to endangered species by arguing that no one has a right to scarce, nonrenewable
goods).
219. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237.
220. Sax, supra note 152, at 1562-63 (discussing John Ruskin's views on cultural patrimony
focusing on human genius).
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culture which cherishes the experiences of conquest, dominion, and
appropriation.22" ' But this is a disingenuous argument. We do recognize and
acknowledge the continuing cultural connection between an object and its
culturally affiliated tribe. This is evident in the way museums try to recreate a
cultural context for objects through the use of music, lighting, props, and
descriptive labels. In many instances, these objects are sufficiently foreign and
exotic, or on the other hand pedestrian to the non-Indian population that the
creation of a context and description is necessary for us to understand their
significance and beauty. As cultural outsiders, we cannot relate to the objects and
the created context cannot succeed in its ultimate goal of making the objects
resonate for us because the cultural experience captured therein is not our
experience. But the creation of a context acknowledges the significance of an
object of cultural property and ignites within us a sense of wonder and awe for
the cultural experience captured in the object.
There is another related argument that is often used by those desiring to retain
cultural property to which they claim no immediate cultural connection. Cultural
property is a part of our common heritage, so the argument goes, and thus those
who have preserved and displayed these objects for the world to see should be
able to continue to do so because doing so helps us to understand other cultures
and creates a sense of connection, a world-wide culture or common heritage.
Thus, what we do with cultural property should seek to strengthen and preserve
this common heritage. One cannot help but notice the imperialistic undertone of
this argument, particularly given how little we understand many pieces of Native
American cultural property and that in many instances objects have been
displayed against the wishes of the culturally affiliated tribe. Violating the
wishes and needs of Native American tribes with respect to their cultural
property neither helps the non-Indian population understand Indian cultures nor
assists in creating a sense of connection. This notion of a common heritage is at
best an amorphous idea and at its worst an excuse to impose a museum-going
culture on an often not-so-receptive Indian population. It is more often than not
an easy excuse to put our own Western educational, scientific, and artistic
demands over and above the interests and integrity of another culture. I do not
wish to diminish the educational initiative behind this idea of a common heritage.
Educating the public is a valid and honorable goal when there is evidence of a
common approach to the treatment of cultural property. But even when this
commonality exists, what is being preserved are the relics of a culture for the
sake of glorifying the accomplishments or mourning the tragedies of that culture.
Our common heritage is, if anything, our ability to appreciate the beauty and
integrity of another culture and so it should be with an eye on preserving cultural
integrity that we go about understanding and dealing with cultural property.
In focusing on the preservation of cultural integrity in our treatment of cultural
property, I am not the first to argue for a different approach to cultural property.
Others have argued that cultural property requires a separate regime of legal
221. This is a familiar British response to Greeks arguing for the return of the Parthenon
Marbles. The British claim that the Parthenon Marbles are in fact more a part of British history
and culture than a part of present day Greek culture. See Merryman, supra note 46, at 1915-16.
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rules. For example Richard Crewdson argues that cultural property forms a
fourth category of property in English law, the other three being real, personal,
and intellectual.222 And an Italian lawyer, Rodata, has stated that:
"Cultural property" now constitutes a new category of goods.... A New
form of ownership which fully reflects the inherent value, in various respects,
of this new category is needed.... The objective should be to introduce a set
of new rules which specifically highlight the "cultural" importance of such
property and the need for a form of protection that also serves the public
interest, which is to conserve and have access to works of art.223
Patrick O'Keefe, one of the most prolific writers in the area of cultural
property," recognizes the value in steering clear of property concepts altogether.
He argues that both moveable and immoveable, tangible and intangible aspects
of cultural heritage-cultural property, human remains and folklife-should be
governed by the same principles. But as with Crewdson and Rodata, preservation
is the central tenet of O'Keefe's "cultural heritage" law.225 Merryman has also
argued that preservation should be the first and foremost goal and principle of
cultural property law.226 But, as previously stated, it must be clear what are our
reasons for preservation. Preservation only makes sense if it serves a higher goal.
To return to our human remains analogy, the burial of a dead body is not a goal
in itself. We go through the process of burying or otherwise respectfully
disposing of the remains of our deceased relatives in deference to their memory
and as a way of safeguarding human dignity. Preservation of cultural property is
appropriate when it is honoring the memory of or reinforcing and protecting the
integrity of the culturally affiliated tribe. Neither education nor scientific
advancement, goals which are often in conflict with tribal attitudes and which
ofteh justify preservation and display, should routinely outweigh the ultimate
principle of cultural integrity.
Proceeding on the assumption that our treatment of cultural property should be
driven by the integrity of the culture and society most closely associated with the
objects in question, who is entitled to possession and what is appropriate
treatment? To begin with, whoever bears the responsibility of possession,
whether it be an individual or a group, holds such property "only as a sacred trust
222. Richard Crewdson, Cultural Property-A Fourth Estate?, 81 THE LAW SOCiETY's
GAZETtE 126, 129 (1984) (discussing briefly the reasons for establishing a new set of property
rules to deal with cultural property).
223. S. Rodata, Explanatory Memorandum, in The Art Trade: Report of the Committee on
Culture and Education, Doc. No. 1126 (Council of Europe ed., 1988), as cited in Patrick
O'Keefe, Intellectual Property, Cultural Property, Cultural Heritage: Do These Further
Indigenous Interests? 6 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
224. See, e.g., 3 LYNDEL V. PROTr & PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL
HERITAGE (1989).
225. O'Keefe, supra note 223, at 7.
226. Merryman, supra note 164, at 361 (arguing that a plausible solution for determining
what to do with cultural property "begins by arranging preservation, truth, and access in
declining order of importance, with the corollary that where they conflict the higher controls").
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for the benefit of all who may ... have an interest in it."'227 Those in possession
of such property are more appropriately thought of as guardians or trustees, not
property owners. Only those groups which are capable of appreciating and
respecting the objects in question in such a way as to best preserve a particular
cultural experience should be entitled to custody. This may entail appreciating
an object as it was originally intended to be appreciated-as a religious figure,
a historical document or a symbol of tribal peace and unity. Thus, as with human
remains, the "right" to hold cultural property under a "sacred trust" is contingent
on proper care and respect and this may not always mean preservation. As
previously stated, preservation is not a value in itself-it is only suitable in those
instances where it serves cultural integrity. There may be occasions, as with the
Zuni War Gods, when the most respectful treatment is destruction or neglect.
Whether destruction, preservation, secrecy, or public display is most appropriate
will differ from case to case and object to object.
Cultural integrity will, in most cases, be best served by returning cultural
property to those who were closest to it-its original custodians and creators.
Again, this is similar to the treatment of human remains in that a surviving
spouse or the next of kin are presumed to be the most appropriate trustees.2" This
is particularly true of those objects for which there is either a special use, a
particular mode of appreciation, or a unique context which the world at large is
not capable of replicating. The Zuni War Gods, for example, are more than just
intriguing works of art; to the Zuni, they are essential features of their religious
and spiritual life. 9 This can be said of most Native American cultural property.
If destruction or concealment reinforces a cultural practice or belief and thus
strengthens the culture then we should not prevent such destruction or
concealment. Both the Zuni and the non-Indian population benefit by permitting
the concealment of the War Gods. The Zuni benefit because they are able to
practice their faith and thus strengthen their community without fear of
interference from non-Zuni. The non-Zuni population benefits in that we have
come just a little bit closer to understanding and respecting foreign practices and
beliefs.
There are and will continue to be, however, circumstances in which return is
not appropriate, just as there are circumstances in which human remains should
be tended to by individuals other than "those most intimately and closely
connected with the deceased by domestic ties."" 0 If destruction is part of a
practice and belief that has long since disappeared into the past or if the object
227. Id at 243; see also Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238,239 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1891) ("[T]his
right is in the nature of a sacred trust... and, if she should neglect or misuse it, of course the
courts would have the power to regulate and control its exercise.").
228. See, e.g., Larson, 50 N.W. at 238-39:
[A]ll courts now concur in holding that the right to the possession of a dead body
for the purposes of decent burial belongs to those most intimately and closely
connected with the deceased by domestic ties, and that this is a right which the
law will recognize and protect.... [A]nd, if she should neglect or misuseit, of
course the courts would have the power to regulate and control its exercise.
229. See Nichols et al., supra note 30, at 33.
230. Larson, 50 N.W. at 238-39.
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in question is no longer revered in a culturally specific way, then preservation
and proper display will best serve cultural integrity by providing an educational
and aesthetic experience. In this eventuality, the individual or group best capable
of preservation and serving the ongoing public interest in cultural integrity
should be entitled to custody. This may very well be a culturally affiliated tribe
but not necessarily so. However, it may be important to give culturally affiliated
tribes the opportunity to preserve and properly display an object if we understand
cultural integrity to be a dynamic, rather than a static notion. We should preserve
cultural objects not just for the sake of enshrining the beauty and wonder of a
tribe's past, but also as a way to shape and strengthen the tribe's future. To the
extent that cultural property resonates for culturally affiliated tribes and in doing
so evokes and strengthens the cultural forces from which the object emerged, we
can more faithfully serve the goal of cultural integrity by insuring culturally
affiliated tribes are close to their objects. It may not always be practical or even
possible to divert funds from the museums which at present house and display
Native American cultural property to culturally affiliated tribes, but if we are to
take seriously our responsibility to protect the integrity of cultures, we should
consider this option. 3'There are, needless to say, problems with this approach, not the least of which
is determining when a specific tribal claim for possession of cultural property is
legitimate and when it may lead to the needless deterioration of an object that
should otherwise be preserved. How are we to determine when such claims are
legitimate and who is to make such decisions? This is bound to be less of a
problem than it might appear. Native American tribes have no incentive to seek
the return of objects given the restraint on alienation inherent in this non-
property approach unless they truly desire to possess the object for cultural
reasons and are capable of preserving it. Given that the preservation of an object
is as much, if not more, in the interest of the culturally affiliated tribe as it is in
the general public, we must learn to have faith in requests for repatriation. A
desire for greater independence and sovereignty may at times influence tribes to
make false claims under the cultural integrity approach but there is no reason to
think that this will be a significant enough problem that we should distrust claims
for repatriation. If a tribe is incapable of caring for its cultural patrimony, it
makes more sense for it to use its increased negotiating power, evidenced in the
passage of NAGPRA, to negotiate a lucrative settlement for the destruction and
alienation of its culture rather than the actual return of the property. There are in
fact many examples of tribes consenting to museum custody of their cultural
property. For example, the Zuni successfully repatriated their War Gods from
museums across the country but refused an offer from the Museum of New
Mexico for the return of Zuni remains.232 When the Nambe were approached by
the Museum of New Mexico with a repatriation offer, they too decided that
culturally significant objects, including two important sacred items, should
remain in the museum for curatorial care until the tribe could itself care for
231. NAGPRA does provide grants to culturally affiliated tribes to assist them in repatriating
their cultural patrimony. 25 U.S.C. § 3008(a) (1994).
232. Livesay, supra note 81, at 297-98.
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them." A group of Hopi elders visited a collection of Hopi kachinas in the Field
Museum of Natural History and instructed the curators on proper care of the
kachinas but did not request their return." Culturally affiliated tribes have
nothing to gain and everything to lose by requesting the return of cultural
property that they desire to preserve but do not have the resources to do so and
thus there is no substantial reason for distrusting claims for repatriation.
Another obvious gap in this analysis is an explanation of the significance of
cultural integrity. Why should the preservation and vitality of a culture trump
property rights? This is obviously a huge issue which is well beyond the scope
of this Article and I will not attempt to provide a satisfactory answer at this time.
Suffice it to say that I do think the vitality of a culture is morally relevant and in
some circumstances worthy of encroaching on that most sacred of individual
rights, property rights. 35
I suspect there are other problems with the cultural integrity approach. I have
outlined it here as simply one possible, relatively unexamined justification for
the repatriation of cultural property which is worthy of further exploration. It is
similar to the previous explanation focusing customary rights in that it operates
on the assumption that there is a peculiar connection between Native Americans
and their cultural property which provides a sufficient justification for
possession and control. But unlike the previous approach it is not based on
absolute ownership rights. Tribes are granted possession merely as the holders
of a "sacred trust." Possession and control is contingent on their ability to
properly care for the object in question and in doing so enhance the integrity of
Native American cultures. It is cultural integrity, not ownership rights, which
drives this final justification for repatriation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Any full exploration of the repatriation of cultural property should account for,
if not rely on, Native American perspectives. But one of the problems of dealing
with the issue of repatriation is that it will almost inevitably involve conflicting
approaches, both legal and moral. Whether we focus on international disputes,
or, as in the case of NAGPRA, domestic controversies over ownership of cultural
property, conflicting legal and moral positions will be argued. The main purpose
of this Article has been to examine whether common law legal principles and
theories of ownership provide any tools for understanding Native American
claims to ownership and NAGPRA's endorsement of repatriation.
We have discovered that the most obvious explanation, compensation, is
neither the strongest nor the most fitting, despite the fact it was apparently
foremost in the minds of the legislators who passed NAGPRA. If we assume that
those in possession have over time developed strong claims, the mere fact that
the property was improperly removed from the tribe at some distant point in the
233. Id. at 298-99.
234. Storch, supra note 182.
235. One need not even have a communitarian view of the world to support such an
approach. See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 162-81 (1991).
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past is not alone sufficient to justify repatriation. It is possible to construct a
compensation argument supporting Native American entitlement but it depends
on identifying a special connection between tribes and their cultural patrimony.
Our desire to rectify the wrongs committed against Native Americans is to say
the least a worthy objective but insufficient for the actual return of the property
in the absence of further evidence regarding the significance of cultural
patrimony to Native American tribes.
In the second Part, we explored reasons for assuming that Native American
tribes never lost their ownership rights in cultural patrimony-NAGPRA merely
recognizes that they are the rightful owners and have been all along. Efficiency
considerations, in particular ethnic externalities, provide a straightforward
justification for recognizing Native American ownership rights but this again
depends on identifying a unique connection between tribes and their cultural
patrimony in order to support the conclusion that the value of the property is
enhanced when owned by Native American tribes. In an attempt to isolate this
unique connection, we first looked at the possibility that cultural patrimony is
constitutive of tribal identity and found that this argument is neither coherent in
its application nor does it justify actual possession. The most convincing
explanation can be found in the doctrine of community customary rights. This
doctrine provides an answer to why such property is more valuable to specific
groups and thus appropriately owned by tribal communities. Cultural patrimony
is, in accordance with this approach, a form of inherently public property in that
its value is enhanced by being accessible to a well-defined subset of the public,
namely a culturally affiliated tribe. The unique socializing and community-
building effect of the property justifies restricting ownership to culturally
affiliated tribes.
The final explanation for the repatriation provisions states that cultural
patrimony is not really owned by anyone, in the full, paradigmatic sense of the
concept of ownership. Our legal and moral attitudes toward human remains
elucidate this otherwise rather hazy proposition. Similar to human remains,
possession and control of cultural patrimony are granted to those groups or
individuals who are reliable guardians-those who can attend to it in a way
which enhances cultural integrity, whether that entails destruction or
preservation. Culturally affiliated tribes will most often be the best custodians
but not always. Repatriation is thus conditioned on tribes asserting an ongoing
particular tradition or belief associated with the property in question or proving
they are capable both financially and otherwise of adequately caring for it.
Thus there are two justifications that we can turn to when attempting to
understand repatriation. Both of them highlight the unique relationship between
Native Americans and their cultural property and draw on common law
traditions. Common law and Anglo-American theories of ownership may in the
end be irrelevant to the question of Native American ownership and the
significance of cultural property to tribal life but it is useful to know that they
can offer us some guidance when seeking to justify repatriation.
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